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ALOKE CHAKRAVARTY* 
INTRODUCTION 
The current approach to combating the financing of terror re­
lies heavily upon trying to deprive resources from developed econo­
mies from flowing to terrorist organizations.1  An effective long-
term strategy to reduce support to terrorist groups also requires the 
building of a popular capacity to deter terrorism as a means to an 
end.  In underdeveloped economies, the influx of humanitarian and 
development aid by both private and public sectors can do so by 
helping to mitigate the socioeconomic factors that exacerbate the 
attraction to violence.2  Simply reacting to existing funding streams 
* J.D., Assistant United States Attorney, District of Massachusetts; former As­
sistant General Counsel, Federal Bureau of Investigation.  This work reflects solely the 
views of the author and does not represent the views of the United States Department 
of Justice or any other component of the government.  Special thanks to Denise Katz 
for her invaluable assistance. 
1. The use of the phrase terrorist organization in this paper is designed to capture 
those organizations that directly or indirectly engage, in whole or in part, in terrorism to 
achieve their ends. See generally JIMMY GURULE, UNFUNDING TERROR (2008). 
2. In the first National Strategy for Combating Terrorism in 2003, one of the four 
pillars of the U.S. strategy was to “[d]iminish underlying conditions that terrorists ex­
ploit by fostering economic, social, and political development, market-based economies, 
good governance, and the rule of law[; p]artner with the international community to 
alleviate conditions leading to failed states that breed terrorism; and use public infor­
mation initiatives to de-legitimize terrorism.”  Raphael Perl, Anti-Terror Strategy, the 9/ 
11 Commission Report, and Terrorism Financing: Implications for U.S. Policy Makers, 
in TERRORISM FINANCING AND STATE RESPONSES: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 247, 
249 (Jeanne K. Giraldo & Harold A. Trinkunas eds., 2007) [hereinafter TERRORISM 
FINANCING AND STATE RESPONSES] (citing EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, NA­
TIONAL STRATEGY FOR COMBATING TERRORISM 22-24 (2003), available at https://www. 
cia.gov/news-information/cia-the-war-on-terrorism/Counter_Terrorism_Strategy.pdf). 
This pillar was relegated to one sentence as a means to promote “effective democracy” 
in the 2006 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism. See EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE 
PRESIDENT, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR COMBATING TERRORISM 10 (2006) [hereinafter 
NATIONAL  STRATEGY 2006], available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/ 
nsc/nsct/2006/nsct2006.pdf. 
295 
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does little to systemically undermine the ideological bases for ter­
rorism’s resonance.  Even as sanctions, regimes, and blocking ac­
tions have been expanded internationally with increasing 
cooperation and technical savvy, they do not fully reach the most 
crucial regions, where government is weak and where terrorists find 
safe haven.  In addition, the current regulation of informal value 
transfer systems (IVTS) and alternative funding models lack the so­
phistication necessary to penetrate these havens.  Though a supply-
based approach of monetary controls is essential to starve terror, in 
order to be effective in the long-term, there must be complemen­
tary conduits for the provision of development aid to reduce de­
mand.  Fostering both public and private aid renders vulnerable 
populations more resilient to terror groups’ attempts to recruit, find 
safe harbor, and manipulate toward their political objectives. 
Moreover, the utility of terror becomes less attractive when other 
means fill the humanitarian void. 
In the United States, the collateral effect of encouraging pri­
vate charitable aid also stands to increase the enfranchisement of 
domestic diaspora who feel chilled in the support of their native 
countrymen.  These communities are essential partners to home­
land security and are responsible for millions of dollars of wealth 
transfer.  In addition to encouraging private aid, the United States 
can also decrease demand through targeted public aid.3  Such lubri­
cation of aid will also likely reduce the domestic disgruntlement 
that increases the incentives for radicalized Americans to under­
mine or attack U.S. interests.  The international effects of increased 
public and private aid, while directly impacting the populations 
where the aid is deployed, may also logically improve the status of 
the American brand and the perception of the motivation of its for­
eign policy objectives which so often fuels the recruiting fire of ter­
rorist organizations.  By increasing counterterrorism development 
aid uncoupled to broad geopolitical objectives, policy makers will 
have greater flexibility on more parochial talking points.  This out­
flow of financing, however, if uncoupled with procedural safe­
guards, vetted recipients, and continued vigilance in blocking 
transfers to terrorists, would risk those organizations becoming the 
greatest beneficiaries of the aid.  In addition, the perception that 
3. Wealth distribution to underdeveloped economies in times of unique and po­
tentially catastrophic crisis also falls within a modern macroeconomic construction of 
Keynes’s theory of governmental investment. See Carol Graham, Can Foreign Aid 
Help Stop Terrorism?, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (2002), http://www.brookings.edu/ 
articles/2002/summer_terrorism_graham.aspx. 
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such aid is strictly an act of grace risks perpetuating a patronizing 
tone of west-centric neocolonialism.  Consequently, in lieu of direct 
governmental aid, developing strategic private-sector and non­
governmental organization (NGO) partners with local government 
involvement—but not control—may buttress the value of govern­
ment while avoiding the risks of graft, corruption, and resentment, 
which frequently infect aid dispersal. 
It stands to reason that a government that cannot sustainably 
provide for its population’s needs is less likely to be an effective 
adopter of international antiterrorism financing mandates.  The sta­
bilization and concomitant empowerment of governments where 
terrorist groups thrive is essential to promote the rule of law and to 
compete with the ideological drivers that sustain the terrorists.  In­
stability allows terrorist groups to fill the civil infrastructure vacu­
ums created when governments are weak or international sanctions 
prevent the influx of resources.4  The role of terrorist organizations 
that also provide development and humanitarian services lies at the 
heart of the problem.  Developing a sustainable strategy includes 
4. A brief vignette illustrates the importance of building a locally governed hu­
manitarian infrastructure.  Shortly after noon on October 5, 2009, a uniformed man 
walked into a heavily fortified United Nations compound in Islamabad, Pakistan. 
There, inside the World Food Program office, the man triggered a device that blew him 
and five others into oblivion.  At the time, the World Food Program was feeding twenty 
million Pakistani people.  For the bomber’s part, his Taliban handlers had taught him to 
attack the infidel, no matter how benevolent their ostensible purpose.  He was surely 
assured of a trip to the afterlife, or that he would avenge what the United States had 
done to his family, or that it would solve some other grievance that could not be com­
bated by a strategy of trying to win this man’s heart or mind.  The Taliban targeted this 
particular site, not only to demonstrate the relative ease with which they could pene­
trate hardened targets, but also because it distributed humanitarian aid.  According to 
their spokesman, they sought to make the point that any “non-Muslim” aid was unwel­
come; the Infidels’ aid was just as bad as their military presence.  The Taliban surely 
calculated the ramifications.  The attack would cause locals to question the acceptability 
of international aid (and international presence) under Sharia (interpretation of 
Qur’an-based Islamic law), it would further demonstrate the irrelevance of Pakistani 
governmental support systems, and ultimately it would solidify the value of the Taliban 
as the organization that, although sanctioned as a terrorist organization, controlled the 
delivery of social services and humanitarian aid to certain parts of the country.  The 
lesson here in the face of a terrorist act should not be that sanctions do not work, nor is 
it to withdraw international humanitarian assistance in needy countries, but rather that 
the U.S. interests are served when they help build local civil infrastructure with local 
partners in place of a foreign presence, and that the coupling of aid to foreign policy 
objectives must be flexible.  The United States must surely block support for terrorist 
organizations, but it must also reinforce the rule of law in the countries where they 
operate, a goal only achievable when basic humanitarian services are being provided to 
the domestic population. 
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decreasing the ability for these organizations to thrive among hos­
tile populations.5 
This Article explores some of the interlinked domestic legal 
frameworks and those areas warranting additional attention, which 
can help a long-term strategy capitalize on the temporary disrup­
tion of financing streams that monetary controls provide.  The Arti­
cle describes the major applicable frameworks pertaining to 
domestic regulation of terrorist financing.  It moves on to focus on 
the conundrum of charitable organizations.  The Article then dis­
cusses legal aspects of private and public aid remittance, followed 
by a conceptual proposal for additional tools that may be helpful to 
make existing antiterrorist financing structures more effective. 
Prudent Regulation and Increased Aid—Supply and Demand 
A realistic way to shift to a more holistic long-term strategy in 
reducing the financing of terror does not abandon the best of the 
current practices.  It is an unavoidable conclusion that blocking 
funds to terrorist groups reduces their ability to achieve their illicit 
goals, at least temporarily.  Similarly, there is no denying that there 
are people in the United States and elsewhere who intentionally 
seek to fund terrorist organizations and are resourceful and creative 
in finding ways to achieve their goal.6  Ideology fuels most terror­
ism.  Consequently, an economic approach to eliminating terror as 
a recognized tool for political action must dry up the physical 
means by which an organization can engage in terror and reduce 
the ideological drivers which can sustain even the poorest of organi­
zations.  In some cases, one is dependent on the other.  The battle 
5. See Violent Islamist Extremism: Government Efforts to Defeat It: Hearing 
Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, 110th Cong. 
(2007) (statement of Chip Poncy, Director, Office of Strategic Policy, for Terrorist Fi­
nancing and Financial Crimes, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury), available at http://hsgac. 
senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.Hearing&Hearing_ID=a3a45e4d­
8a9f-4a54-a245-f50743eb1b71 (under “Witnesses,” follow “View Testimony” hyperlink 
for Chip Poncy). 
6. While many of those who intentionally fund terrorist organizations do so in 
order to support their humanitarian activities, it cannot be denied that many U.S. re­
sidents have intended to support terrorist activities.  The Muslim-American community 
recognizes the existence of a few extremists who do most Muslims significant harm in 
the public eye. See PEW  RESEARCH  CENTER, MUSLIM  AMERICANS: MIDDLE  CLASS 
AND MOSTLY MAINSTREAM 6, 54 (2007) [hereinafter MUSLIM AMERICANS], available at 
http://pewresearch.org/assets/pdf/muslim-americans.pdf (finding that approximately 
five percent of the U.S. Muslim population is supportive of Al-Qaeda, eight percent 
support suicide attacks against civilians, and fifty-eight percent view Al-Qaeda very un­
favorably); see also Perl, supra note 2, at 255. R 
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against the financing of terror must be premised on the 
macroeconomic strategy of reducing demand for the service by 
making it an undesirable and unnecessary choice in the market­
place of ideas.  While this approach is not a panacea for the ideo­
logically intransigent, those outliers are more susceptible to other 
tactics.  The more practical barriers that can be erected, such as 
sanctions regimes, the more difficult it is for would-be donors to 
terrorist organizations to be successful. 
There are, however, significant inefficiencies in a reactive sys­
tem of formal monetary controls relying on international coopera­
tion and financial transparency.  This is especially the case in the 
developing world, where IVTS are more frequently used than bank 
accounts, and where Al-Qaeda’s method of operation is increas­
ingly decentralized and increasingly reliant on inspiring discon­
nected terrorist operations.7  Moreover, when such monetary 
restrictions deprive communities of humanitarian assistance, they 
conversely reinforce ideological opposition.  In those circum­
stances, the financing of terrorism will prosper wherever there are 
networked populations who are desperate enough to perceive ter­
rorism as a palatable and effective political option.  In addition to 
the other tools of international power, this perception must be com­
bated internally and externally. 
Partnering with the Muslim-American Community 
At present, the predominant attention of terrorism financing is 
focused on the Muslim world.8  With this concentration, the impact 
7. See NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, THE 
9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 382-83 (2004) [hereinafter 9/11 REPORT], available at http:// 
govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report.pdf; see also JOHN  ROTH ET AL., NAT’L 
COMM’N ON  TERRORIST  ATTACKS UPON THE  UNITED  STATES, MONOGRAPH ON  TER­
RORIST  FINANCING—STAFF  REPORT TO THE  COMMISSION 17-29 (2004), available at 
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/staff_statements/911_TerrFin_Monograph.pdf.  More­
over, when terrorist organizations are designated, they frequently reemerge under alter­
nate names and intelligence professionals must reestablish the connections between the 
new organization and the designated one. See Salman Masood, Terror Suspect Cleared 
Again in Pakistan, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2009, at A10 (describing Lashkar-e-Taiba 
founder as leader of Jamaat-ud-Dawaa because the latter has not yet been designated 
as a terrorist group in Pakistan despite being the same organization); see also Trial 
Exhibit 213A, United States v. Mubayyid, 567 F. Supp. 2d 223 (D. Mass. 2008) (No. 05­
40026-FDS) (on file with author) (showing notes of a meeting, seized from a defunct 
Muslim charity, discussing other aligned charities, and stating, “[i]f one organization 
closes another will stay open”). 
8. Organizations and individuals, such as the Taliban, Al-Qaeda, and Usama bin 
Laden, who, in the name of Islam, have declared war on the United States, have been 
identified by the intelligence community and policymakers as currently posing the 
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on and of the diaspora should not be underestimated.  Approxi­
mately $62 billion is remitted from diaspora communities in the 
United States to their native lands every year.9  Some of this trans­
fer is pursuant to the religious obligation of Muslims to give obliga­
tory alms, known as zakat.  This market power is wielded, in part, 
by the disproportionately impacted population of Muslim and vari­
ous ethnic groups who have felt the brunt of civil rights implications 
of post-September 11, 2001 counterterrorism strategies.  Foreign 
Muslims similarly view the U.S. counterterrorism strategy as impru­
dent and discriminatory from afar, further chilling their willingness 
for economic or humanitarian engagement.  The cry from the do­
mestic Muslim community (albeit heterogeneous and only partially 
represented) has been that their desire to support their families and 
needy overseas communities is being squelched.  They also com­
plain that their desire to express their support for organizations or 
populations who may hold values different from the United States 
mainstream or to its foreign policy interests has erected barriers to 
their cooperation with the government.10  By recognizing the im­
pact of this perception, policymakers and those who execute the 
laws will be better equipped to wield these tools responsibly, and 
with a longer view on both domestic and foreign policy fronts. 
I. LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR COMBATING TERROR FINANCING 
A. Blacklists and Monetary Transfer Regulations 
Counterterrorism professionals basically have two categorical 
tools at their disposal to root out and prevent terrorism financing. 
The first is the very public act of designating specific individuals and 
entities as being bad actors and prohibiting financial transactions 
greatest threat to United States national security interests. See President Barack 
Obama, Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on the Way Forward in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan (Dec. 1, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the­
press-office/remarks-president-address-nation-way-forward-afghanistan-and-pakistan; 
see also NATIONAL STRATEGY 2006, supra note 2, at 5-6. R 
9. See HUDSON INSTITUTE, INDEX OF GLOBAL PHILANTHROPY 14 (2007), availa­
ble at http://gpr.hudson.org/files/publications/IndexGlobalPhilanthropy2007.pdf. 
10. According to the Pew Study, seventy-six percent of Muslim Americans 
viewed their obligation to give zakat as very important. MUSLIM  AMERICANS, supra 
note 6, at 25.  The ACLU and various Muslim advocacy organizations have criticized R 
the existence of the designation process as a violation of the freedom of religion of 
Muslims whose ability to discharge their obligations to give zakat are allegedly being 
chilled. See AMERICAN  CIVIL  LIBERTIES  UNION, BLOCKING  FAITH, FREEZING  CHAR­
ITY: CHILLING  MUSLIM  CHARITABLE  GIVING IN THE “WAR ON  TERRORISM  FINANC­
ING” 23 (2009), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/humanrights/blockingfaith. 
pdf. 
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with them.  This tactic has been favored by U.S. policymakers and 
the arms of government that engage in public actions, such as the 
Departments of Justice and Treasury.  The United Nations and 
other international bodies have followed suit.  Public designation 
serves both a specific and general deterrent purpose and provides a 
mechanism for enforcement that also provides some objective met­
ric as to the impact of a government’s regulation of terrorism fi­
nancing.11  The second approach is that preferred by intelligence 
professionals and diplomats: to “follow the money.”  With this tac­
tic, once the conduits of financing are identified, other tools of na­
tional power are used to take action, sometimes covertly.12  In fact, 
these approaches are not mutually exclusive and should be blended 
appropriately to counter varied financing streams. 
In addition to requiring increased financial transparency by in­
stituting rigorous currency and suspicious activity reporting, a cen­
tral pillar of the U.S. government’s effort to combat terrorist 
financing has been the public campaign to expose the sources and 
conduits of terrorist financing by designating them on “blacklists.”13 
While the impact of the governmental measures to prevent terror­
ism financing may have been perceived by some as heavy handed 
on internal and external relationships, the absolute flow of money 
to terrorist organizations has been limited.  Adequate metrics have 
not been established to test this value proposition.  Yet, one fact is 
clear: the blocking actions since September 2001 have prevented 
millions of dollars from going overseas from the United States and 
11. The blocking of assets as a metric for the effectiveness of designation is an 
imperfect barometer but perhaps the only quantifiable one that can be compared across 
paradigms.  When a terrorist organization is deprived of funds, whether earmarked for 
humanitarian purposes or not, it must poach from other sources in order to engage in its 
activities.  This creates a barrier to their activities, whether acts of terrorism or 
otherwise. 
12. See Anne L. Clunan, U.S. and International Responses to Terrorist Financing, 
in TERRORISM FINANCING AND STATE RESPONSES, supra note 2, at 260, 277 (suggesting R 
a nonpublic route allows greater flexibility for traditional intelligence-disruption tech­
niques—such as military action, capturing and detaining terrorists, assassinations, cov­
ert assistance, pure intelligence gathering, and more liberal information sharing with 
private sector—and leaves more options at the diplomatic tables). 
13. Pursuant to the Bank Secrecy Act and the USA PATRIOT Act, a host of 
regulations require financial institutions to gather information about the true identities 
of their customers, a so-called “know your customer” program, which also requires data 
retention and obligations to file Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) with the govern­
ment in the face of unusual patterns or practices. See generally 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311-5330 
(2006); 31 C.F.R. pt. 103 (2009). 
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international partners.14  Even if the designations were only par­
tially accurate and only a fraction of this money was destined for 
terrorist organizations, its absence either prevented operations or 
forced the depletion of alternative sources of money.  By blacklist­
ing terrorists and their financiers and facilitators, the United States 
and its international partners restrict the flow of funds to these enti­
ties, at least through the traditional financial channels.15 
Domestically, there are three similar and often parallel desig­
nation processes designed to block the flow of funds.  The first is 
the designation of certain foreign organizations and entities as For­
eign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) by the Secretary of State, in 
consultation with the Attorney General and the Secretary of Trea­
sury.16  This designation provides notice of organizations with 
which one cannot transact business without risking criminal prose­
cution pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act (AEDPA) for providing material support to terrorist organiza­
tions.17  Anyone providing funds or other types of material support 
to these organizations can suffer serious sanctions under the crimi­
nal law as implemented under AEDPA.18  A related but distinct list 
that the State Department controls is the Terrorist Exclusion List.19 
This list authorizes Department of State and Homeland Security 
authorities to exclude from admission into the United States any­
one associated with, including those who donate to, an organization 
on the list.20 
The second relevant designation pertains to Specially Desig­
nated Global Terrorist (SDGT) entities or nationals made by the 
Secretary of Treasury through the Office of Foreign Assets Control 
14. According to the Department of Treasury, as of 2007, approximately $21 mil­
lion of terrorist-organization money remains blocked by Executive Orders. See OFFICE 
OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, TERRORIST ASSETS REPORT 
6 (2007) [hereinafter 2007 TERRORIST ASSETS REPORT], available at http://www.ustreas. 
gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/reports/tar2007.pdf. 
15. The preamble to Executive Order 13,224, which is aimed at blocking assets 
and prohibiting financial transactions with terrorists and their supporters or affiliates, 
states, “[B]ecause of the pervasiveness and expansiveness of the financial foundation of 
foreign terrorists, financial sanctions may be appropriate for those foreign persons that 
support or otherwise associate with these foreign terrorists.”  Exec. Order No. 13,224, 3 
C.F.R. 786 (2002), available as amended at http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/enforcement/ 
ofac/programs/terror/terror.pdf. 
16. The Secretary of State is authorized to designate FTOs under 8 U.S.C. § 1189. 
17. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B. 
18. See id. 
19. The Secretary of State is authorized to create a Terrorist Exclusion List under 
8 U.S.C. § 1182. 
20. 8 U.S.C. § 1189. 
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(OFAC).21  The authority for this process is based on the Interna­
tional Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA).22  Designations 
under IEEPA can only be made if the President has declared a na­
tional emergency as required in IEEPA.23  Although some organi­
zations had previously been blocked based on prior orders, 
Executive Order 13,224 blocks, pursuant to IEEPA and the United 
Nations Participation Act (UNPA), the assets of those terrorists 
and terrorist organizations as well as their affiliates and sponsors.24 
21. 31 C.F.R. pts. 594-97 (2009) (Global Terrorism Sanction Regulations). 
22. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-07.  The IEEPA is, among other things, also the enabling 
criminal statute that continues to provide an enforcement mechanism of the Export 
Administration Regulations (EAR), 15 C.F.R. pts. 730 and 744, which were established 
while the Export Administration Act (EAA) was in effect.  Exec. Order No. 13,222, 3 
C.F.R. 783 (2002); Notice of July 23, 2008, Continuation of Emergency Regarding Ex­
port Control Regulations, 73 Fed. Reg. 43,603 (July 25, 2008) (most recent presidential 
extension of 13,222).  The EAA regulates the transfer of technologies that have both 
civilian and military use, called “dual-use” technologies.  Through the EARs, the reach 
of IEEPA’s criminal-sanction regime prohibits transactions beyond merely the blacklist 
of SDGTs to those entities and countries to which a license is required prior to export­
ing dual-use technologies.  A similar law, the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), ap­
plies to the regulation of exporting technology that has been designated by the 
Secretary of State as having military application pursuant to the United States Muni­
tions List located within the International Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR).  22 
U.S.C. § 2778; 22 C.F.R. § 121.1 (2009).  AECA is not implemented by IEEPA and 
carries its own criminal penalty structure.  22 U.S.C. § 2778(c). 
23. The President may declare a national emergency if he finds “any unusual and 
extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the 
United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United 
States.”  50 U.S.C. § 1701(a).  The President’s authority “may only be exercised to deal 
with an unusual and extraordinary threat with respect to which a national emergency 
has been declared . . . and may not be exercised for any other purpose.” Id. § 1701(b). 
24. Prior to September 11, 2001, the President issued Executive Order No. 12,947 
to block transactions with terrorist entities who threatened the Middle East peace pro­
cess.  Exec. Order No. 12,947, 3 C.F.R. 319 (1995).  After September 11, 2001, the Presi­
dent issued Executive Order No. 13,224, also pursuant to IEEPA.  Exec. Order No. 
13,224, 3 C.F.R. 786 (2002), available as amended at http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/ 
enforcement/ofac/programs/terror/terror.pdf.  The Treasury Department’s Office of 
Foreign Assets Control issues a list of Specially Designated Nationals (SDNs). OFFICE 
OF  FOREIGN  ASSETS  CONTROL, U.S. DEP’T OF THE  TREASURY, SPECIALLY  DESIG­
NATED NATIONALS AND BLOCKED PERSONS, http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ 
ofac/sdn/t11sdn.pdf (updated Apr. 28, 2010).  All current FTOs have also been desig­
nated under IEEPA pursuant to Executive Order 13,224.  U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 
Key Issues: Protecting Charitable Organizations (Feb. 21, 2006), http://www.treas.gov/ 
offices/enforcement/key-issues/protecting/charities_exec-orders.shtml [hereinafter Pro­
tecting Charitable Organizations]. 
Federal courts have upheld the constitutionality of the designation process. See 
United States v. Afshari, 426 F.3d 1150, 1154-55 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that Secre­
tary’s designation statute is not facially unconstitutional because judicial review is re­
stricted to D.C. Circuit and that 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(8) of title 8, which prevents an 
organization from challenging designation in defense of material support charge, does 
not violate due process); People’s Mujahedin Org. of Iran v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 327 
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When the Secretary of Treasury designates an individual or an en­
tity as an SDGT, all U.S. persons and U.S.-based organizations, in­
cluding charities, are prohibited from engaging in financial 
transactions with those individuals or entities unless authorized by 
the Treasury Department’s OFAC.25 
In addition to financially isolating designees by freezing or 
blocking their U.S. assets and stopping the funneling of funds by 
terrorist supporters, designations also help scrupulous donors and 
charitable organizations identify persons and entities involved in 
terrorist fundraising and support activities.26  Under the implement­
ing regulations, even humanitarian aid can be restricted upon a 
finding of good cause.27  The ability of government to quickly block 
an organization upon sufficient cause, but before a lengthy investi­
gation can be concluded, is essential to the effectiveness of this par­
adigm built upon denial of resources to terrorist organizations. 
Consequently, an important but controversial aspect of IEEPA in 
the context of terrorist financing is the authorization it gives the 
government to block an organization’s assets “pending investiga­
tion.”28  The final mechanism for blocking assets, not discussed in 
F.3d 1238, 1242-43 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding that Secretary’s reliance on classified infor­
mation in making designation conforms with due process); People’s Mujahedin Org. of 
Iran v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 182 F.3d 17, 22 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (holding that statute author­
izing Secretary of State to designate terrorist organizations with no U.S. presence does 
not violate groups’ due process rights). But see Nat’l Council of Resistance of Iran v. 
U.S. Dep’t of State, 251 F.3d 192, 204, 208 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (holding that organizations 
with U.S. presence subject to designation process may be deprived of property rights 
only if afforded due process consisting of notice and the meaningful opportunity to be 
heard). 
25. Protecting Charitable Organizations, supra note 24. R 
26. Designations thus act to deter supporters from directly funding terrorist activ­
ity or facilitating terrorist financing. See Juan Carlos Zarate, Bankrupting Terrorists, 
EJOURNAL USA, Sept. 2004, at 3, 4 (explaining the inherently preventive function of 
designations). 
27. The Department of Treasury’s regulations promulgated to implement Execu­
tive Order 12,947 are found at 31 C.F.R. pt. 595.  Specifically, section 595.408(a) prohib­
its charitable contributions to SDTs, including “donation[s] of funds, goods, services, or 
technology to relieve human suffering, such as food, clothing or medicine.”  31 C.F.R. 
§ 595.408(a) (2009).  This prohibition extends to inchoate offenses. Id. § 595.205. 
28. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701, 1702(a)(1)(B).  The constitutionality of this preemptive 
freezing of assets has been brought into question by at least one U.S. district court. 
Compare KindHearts for Charitable and Humanitarian Dev., Inc. v. Timothy Geithner, 
647 F. Supp. 2d 857, 872-76 (N.D. Ohio 2009) (holding that IEEPA’s authorization to 
block assets of an organization which was under investigation for designation by OFAC 
constitutes a violation of the Fourth Amendment), with Islamic Am. Relief Agency v. 
Unidentified FBI Agents, 394 F. Supp. 2d 34, 37-48 (D.D.C. 2005) (determining that 
asset-blocking was a nonseizure under the Fourth Amendment), and Holy Land Found. 
for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 219 F. Supp. 2d 57, 79 (D.D.C. 2002) (same).  In 
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great detail here, is the Secretary of State’s authority to designate 
entire countries who are State Sponsors of Terrorism.29 
B. International Regulation 
In addition to domestic blacklists, the United States and other 
countries have successfully lobbied many international partners to 
participate in the recommendations of the United Nations and the 
Financial Action Task Force30 (FATF), among other international 
working groups.  The United Nations and some of its members 
have also created their own blacklists to restrict the financing of 
terror.31  In addition, many countries have ratified the United Na-
KindHearts, the district court held, inter alia, that a blocking action is not a “taking” 
under the Fifth Amendment but rather is a seizure under the Fourth Amendment; that 
the exigency of an executive branch determination of need does not unilaterally render 
a blocking action reasonable; and that the notice of pre-designation blocking was con­
stitutionally inadequate under the Due Process clauses. KindHearts, 647 F. Supp. 2d at 
872-73, 876, 904-05, 918. 
29. The state sponsor list is a product of the Export Administration Act of 1979, 
the Arms Export Control Act, and the Foreign Assistance Act.  The four countries 
currently sanctioned as SSTs are Cuba, Sudan, Iran, and Syria.  Office of the Coordina­
tor for Counterterrorism, U.S. Dep’t of State, State Sponsors of Terrorism, http://www. 
state.gov/s/ct/c14151.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2010).  Approximately $315 million of 
SST assets in the United States have been blocked as of 2007.  2007 TERRORIST ASSETS 
REPORT, supra note 14, at 2.  This paper does not discuss in detail the tacit means by R 
which several nations fund ostensibly charitable organizations that are controlled by or 
fund terrorist organizations.  Issues surrounding this large volume of systematic funding 
are largely diplomatic questions, although in some cases designations could but, for 
political reasons, may not follow.  It is enough for these purposes to recognize that 
certain countries, like the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, have historically funneled billions 
of dollars toward regions where the money has historically been diverted to terrorist 
organizations.  Diplomatic steps have been taken to address this issue. See COUNCIL ON 
FOREIGN  RELATIONS, UPDATE ON THE  GLOBAL  CAMPAIGN  AGAINST  TERRORIST  FI­
NANCING 16-26 (2004), available at http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/ 
Revised_Terrorist_Financing.pdf. 
30. The Financial Action Task Force was originally established at a Group of 
Seven meeting in 1989 and included fifteen original participating countries. See FATF, 
About the FATF, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/0,3417,en_32250379_32236836_1_1_1_1 
_1,00.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2010).  The original mission was to counter interna­
tional money laundering, but after September 11, 2001, the mission was expanded to 
tackle terrorism financing. Id.  The FATF has issued numerous recommendations on 
how to increase the international cooperation to stem terrorism financing. Id. 
31. Pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1267, since 1999, the 
United Nations has maintained a list of Al-Qaeda- and Taliban-related individuals and 
entities with whom financial transactions are prohibited. See generally S.C. Res. 1267, 
art. 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1267 (Oct. 15, 1999); 1267 COMM., U.N. SEC. COUNCIL, THE 
CONSOLIDATED  LIST, available at http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/pdf/ 
consolidatedlist.pdf (last updated Apr. 19, 2010).  The Security Council also established 
a United Nations Monitoring Group (UNMG) after the September 2001 attacks on the 
United States, which made several recommendations on how to bolster the efficacy of 
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tions Convention on the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism 
(Terrorism Financing Convention) and have, at least in principle, 
agreed to provide meaningful assistance to other sovereigns who 
are trying to “follow the money” to terrorist groups.32  Finally, 
many countries, both those that are economically developed and 
those that are not, have enacted domestic versions of the antiterror­
ism financing regimes that international groups have encouraged.33 
The importance of the international component of a sanctions re­
gime cannot be overemphasized as essential to a sanctions regime. 
Opprobrium from the international community of the financing of 
terror is essential to prevent safe-haven or pass-through countries 
and to stigmatize the behavior that creates further deterrence to its 
adoption as an attractive political choice. 
The role of international criminal law and international tribu­
nals in preventing cross-border financing of terrorism has also been 
underutilized.  The lack of such multilateral, cross-cultural prosecu­
tion does nothing to dissuade the common refrain from terrorist 
sympathizers that sanctions and prosecutions are politically moti­
vated tools designed to continue the discrimination that the West­
ern world imposes upon those who do not agree with them.  More 
practically, when adjudications in unsophisticated domestic courts 
carry accusations of political manipulation, a multilateral tribunal 
provides a unique and necessary forum through which to expose 
and punish offenders of the covenants against terrorism that mem­
ber states have agreed upon.  In this context, the United Nations 
has not brought a criminal case or convened a special court or tribu­
nal to specifically address international terrorism financing.  In fact, 
with one exception, the United Nations has largely left the prosecu­
tion of terrorism to eager member states, despite the cross-border, 
universally condemnable, and deeply impacting nature of many of 
the designation lists.  The UNMG was disbanded in 2004. See generally Colum Lynch, 
UN Dissolves Panel Monitoring Al Qaeda, WASH. POST, Feb. 2, 2004, available at http:// 
www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/202/41452.html.  The designation of 
individuals pursuant to Resolution 1267, along with multinational designation schemes 
such as that promulgated by the European Union, remains in effect. 
32. See International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terror­
ism, G.A. Res. 54/109, art. 9, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/54/49 
(Dec. 9, 1999) [hereinafter Terrorism Financing Convention]. 
33. See United Nations, Uniting Against Terrorism Report, Annex I, Inventory of 
United Nations Counter-terrorism Activities, http://www.un.org/unitingagainstterror­
ism/annex1.htm (last visited Apr. 28, 2010) (“The United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime has assisted 112 countries in becoming parties to and implementing the universal 
instruments related to the prevention and suppression of international terrorism, and 
provided legislative advice on counter-terrorism to 67 countries.”). 
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these crimes.34  Notwithstanding the glacial pace of international 
justice and the limits of its breadth and efficiency, the option of 
utilizing an international tribunal under international law should be 
a forward-looking weapon in the global community’s arsenal to de­
ter terror.  Moreover, the persuasive impact of a neutral and inclu­
sive court proceeding will resonate much more in areas of the world 
that instinctively criticize the Western system of justice as self-serv­
ing, open-ended, and oppressive, such as the criticism levied against 
Guantanamo Bay. 
C. Alternative Financing Systems 
Blacklists do little to monitor IVTSs.  While international 
norms of regulation, technical assistance, and information sharing 
must increase for them to be effective in a shrinking world, they 
must be implemented both for the formal money transfer systems 
as well as the opaque IVTSs that permeate the developing world. 
Informal systems account for billions of dollars of money transfers 
every year.35  A truly effective antiterrorist financing program re­
quires extensive international cooperation, transparent governmen­
tal participation, and legal frameworks that reach both formal and 
informal channels of commerce.36 
34. The only United Nations tribunal thus far convened specifically to address an 
act or acts of terror is the Special Court of Lebanon, which is investigating the assassi­
nation of Lebanese President Rafiq Hariri. See generally Global Policy Forum, Special 
Tribunal for Lebanon, http://www.globalpolicy.org/international-justice/international­
criminal-tribunals-and-special-courts/special-tribunal-for-lebanon.html (last visited Feb. 
3, 2010).  The political circumstances leading to the creation of this tribunal are signifi­
cantly unique to be an unlikely source of precedent.  United Nations Security Council 
resolution 1757 endorsed the tribunal only after a variety of unique circumstances.  S.C. 
Res. 1757, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1757 (May 30, 2007).  Other tribunals (Rwanda and former 
Yugoslavia) have allowed for the prosecution of terrorism offenses but only in the con­
text of other human rights violations.  The International Criminal Court has yet to 
demonstrate its efficacy in this regard. 
35. The imagination is the only limit to the mechanisms of alternative financing 
systems.  From traditional money laundering vehicles such as drug trafficking, petty 
crime, cigarette smuggling, gambling, and cash businesses, to more sophisticated finan­
cial tools like investments in publicly traded companies and mutual funds, money des­
tined for terrorist organizations comes from all manner of financing. See U.S. GEN. 
ACCOUNTING  OFFICE, TERRORIST  FINANCING: U.S. AGENCIES  SHOULD  SYSTEMATI­
CALLY ASSESS TERRORISTS’ USE OF ALTERNATIVE FINANCING MECHANISMS 24 (2003) 
[hereinafter TERRORIST FINANCING], available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04163. 
pdf.  Estimates of the volume of informal financial channels necessarily vary; the 
United Nations estimates it in the $200 billion range, while the World Bank and Inter­
national Monetary Fund estimate the amount to be in the tens of billions. Id. 
36. Classic IVTSs, such as hawalas, cash exchanges, or bartering for services, are 
the primary methods of commerce in some parts of the world and are extremely hard to 
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Informal channels pose a special set of problems because they 
require regulation in a world in which regulation is frequently for­
eign.  Informal channels must be formalized to prosper in a modern 
economy.  Some countries, like the United States, have imple­
mented a licensing requirement, which brings with it some report­
ing obligations.  Consequently, unreported transactions must be 
presumed to be operating with “black” or dirty money.  Registra­
tion of hawalas and other recipient nodes, instituting “know your 
customer-type” (KYC) regulations, establishing requirements to re­
tain records, and subjecting services to audit and supervision must 
be measures mandated to international norms and with indepen­
dent oversight.37 
D. Potential Overinclusiveness 
The constitutional tensions in a framework of laws that 
criminalize the transfer of money to an entity simply because it is 
contrary to the Executive’s political determination are readily ap­
parent.38  Equally obvious, however, is the necessity and preroga­
tive of the commander-in-chief to protect U.S. interests against 
supporting terrorist organizations.39  This tension has led to the fre­
systematically regulate. See Clunan, supra note 12, at 261.  Licensing systems have R 
been used to bring these systems into the light in other countries. See generally 18 
U.S.C. § 1960 (2006); 31 U.S.C. § 5330.  The effectiveness of stemming terrorist financ­
ing by requiring licenses for money remitting services is yet unknown. 
37. See Benedetta Berti, THE ECONOMICS OF COUNTERTERRORISM: DEVISING A 
NORMATIVE  REGULATORY  FRAMEWORK FOR THE  HAWALA  SYSTEM, MASS. INST. OF 
TECH. INT’L REV., Spring 2008, at 14, 19-21, available at http://web.mit.edu/mitir/2008/ 
spring/2008-spring-mitir.pdf; Herbert V. Morais, Fighting International Crime and Its 
Financing: The Importance of Following a Coherent Global Strategy Based on the Rule 
of Law, 50 VILL. L. REV. 583, 619-21 (2005). 
38. While the decision to designate an organization is ultimately one of policy, 
these political decisions are traditionally well within the unique province of the Execu­
tive to manage international and national security affairs.  The constitutional and statu­
tory authority in the areas of foreign policy and national security are exclusively 
entrusted to the elected branches of government. See, e.g., Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 
222, 242 (1984) (“Matters relating ‘to the conduct of foreign relations . . . are so exclu­
sively entrusted to the political branches of government as to be largely immune from 
judicial inquiry or interference.’” (citation omitted)); Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 292 
(1981) (“Matters intimately related to foreign policy and national security are rarely 
proper subjects for judicial intervention.”); People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. U.S. 
Dep’t of State, 182 F.3d 17, 23 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
39. Prior to the enactment of IEEPA, the declaration of national emergencies was 
done at the discretion of the President, who claimed such power as necessary to address 
the emergency. Compare Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 
U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (“A seizure executed by the President pursuant to an Act of Con­
gress would be supported by the strongest of presumptions and the widest latitude of 
judicial interpretation, and the burden of persuasion would rest heavily upon any who 
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quent constitutional challenges of the designation decisions and 
§ 2339B prosecutions based on support to a FTO, and IEEPA pros­
ecutions based on transactions with SDGTs.40  In the context of ter­
rorism financing, the primary arguments are (1) the statutes are 
overbroad and violate individuals’ First Amendment rights, (2) the 
Executive’s unilateral blocking of assets violates the Fourth 
Amendment, and (3) the designation process denies due process. 
Despite these attacks, the constitutionality of these statutes remains 
intact.  The limitation on freedom of expression has been upheld 
under the intermediate constitutional scrutiny associated with con­
tent-neutral regulation of expression.41 
The administrative-designation process has also survived due 
process scrutiny, even when a designated entity is not privy to any 
classified national security information that may have been part of 
the administrative record reviewed by the Secretary who designated 
might attack it.”), with United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936) 
(holding that the President may exercise powers in the field of international relations 
without needing “a basis for its exercise [in] an act of Congress”).  With the enactment 
of IEEPA, Congress also passed the National Emergencies Act, clarifying the termina­
tion of the authorities invoked by prior presidents in past emergencies, and specifying a 
selective process by which certain emergency powers, including sanctions regimes, 
could be exercised by the President in an emergency situation. See 50 U.S.C. 
§§ 1601-51. 
40. See, e.g., People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 327 F.3d 
1238, 1240-41 (D.C. Cir. 2003).  “Such questions concerning the foreign policy decisions 
of the Executive Branch present political judgments, decisions of a kind for which the 
Judiciary has neither aptitude, facilities nor responsibilities and have long been held to 
belong in the domain of political power not subject to judicial intrusion or inquiry.” Id. 
(internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 
41. The Supreme Court confirmed that strict constitutional scrutiny does not ap­
ply to facially neutral laws.  Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886 n.3 (1990). 
The transfer of money to selected recipients has been held to be a form of speech pro­
tected by the Constitution.  Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 16 (1976).  The Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals has held that prohibiting transactions and activities that would assist 
designated FTOs are content-neutral restrictions reasonably tailored to the govern­
ment’s legitimate national security interests.  Humanitarian Law Project v. Mukasey, 
509 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2007); Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 
1135-36 (9th Cir. 2000).  As such, the Court has held that such neutral designations do 
not violate the First Amendment, see Reno, 205 F.3d at 1134-36, and are not overbroad, 
see Mukasey, 509 F.3d at 1136-37.  The Fourth and Seventh Circuits have followed suit. 
See United States v. Hammoud, 381 F.3d 316, 329-30 (4th Cir. 2004) (en banc); Boim v. 
Quranic Literacy Inst. & Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev., 291 F.3d 1000, 1026-27 
(7th Cir. 2002).  The District of Columbia Court of Appeals employed the same analysis 
to uphold the constitutionality of IEEPA restrictions on expression. See Holy Land 
Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156, 166 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding no 
constitutional right to support terrorists). 
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the entity.42  Finally, courts have held that in post-designation 
blocking and asset-freeze actions, the Executive acts pursuant to 
statutory authority and thereby does not usurp the legislative or ju­
dicial prerogative.43 
The primary complaints of civil libertarian groups and affected 
communities are that these sanctions increase alienation, under­
mine U.S. efforts in Muslim countries, encourage less transparent 
means of funding, and chill humanitarian relief.44  From a legal per­
spective, sympathetic constituencies seek to ensure that regardless 
of whether an organization deserves to be blocked, it should have a 
right to advocacy.45  That is to say, an organization’s supporters 
should be permitted to use the organization’s own funds to pay for 
legal counsel to fight its designation,46 and it should be able to ad­
vocate on its own behalf without fear of crossing a line of providing 
material support to a designated organization.47  While notably 
none of the designation statutes prohibit membership or “associa­
tion” with a terrorist organization, the criteria for what could be 
construed as material support for the organization is broad.48  Some 
42. The process to designate FTOs involves an administrative determination by 
the Secretary of State, with notice to Congress, a preservation of the record, publication 
in the Federal Register, and an opportunity to seek judicial review.  8 U.S.C. §§ 1189(a), 
(c).  The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia found that this 
procedure was constitutionally adequate; however, the organization could not challenge 
the procedure’s constitutionality because “[a] foreign entity without property or pres­
ence in this country has no constitutional rights.” People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran, 182 
F.3d at 22.  After a later challenge by an organization with sufficient connections to the 
United States, the District of Columbia Circuit Court held that the designated organiza­
tion had a due process right to respond to the unclassified predication for the designa­
tion decision. See Nat’l Council of Resistance of Iran v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 251 F.3d 
192, 208-09 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
43. See Global Relief Found., Inc. v. O’Neill, 315 F.3d 748, 754 (7th Cir. 2002).
 
There is no separation-of-powers problem, as Dames & Moore [v. Regan]
 
shows.  The Steel Seizure Case, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, dealt
 
with a seizure of private assets under a President’s inherent powers, which the
 
Court deemed insufficient; Executive Order 13224, by contrast, delegates to
 
the Secretary only those powers provided by statute.
 
Id. (citation omitted).  For pre-designation blocking actions, a district court has found 
the process constitutionally infirm.  Kindhearts for Charitable Humanitarian Dev., Inc. 
v. Geithner, 647 F. Supp. 2d 857, 884-85 (N.D. Ohio 2009). 
44. See  AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 10, at 16. R 
45. See id. at 21. 
46. Id. at 18. 
47. Id. at 21-22. 
48. While the material support and IEEPA laws stop short of criminalizing mem­
bership, there is a constitutional basis to do so in limited circumstances.  Scales v. 
United States, 367 U.S. 203, 228-30 (1961).  During the height of the Cold War, Scales, a 
chairman of the Communist Party, was arrested for violating the Smith Act (which 
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speculate that terrorist organizations may seek to selfishly exploit 
this advocacy immunity.  The effect may be to manipulate their ad­
versaries to discourage such actions because of the inordinate 
amounts of resources and time necessary to navigate the legal pro­
cess which inhibits the efficiency and potency of counterterrorism 
actions.49  Moreover, there is no right to counsel in civil proceed­
ings.50  Should policymakers seek a prophylaxis to future due pro­
cess attacks, a reasonable compromise position could be taken that 
balances the concerns.  For example, providing a limited ability for 
advocates to be rationed a capped limit of the blocked assets at a 
rate commensurate to how such funds are dispersed to court-
appointed private counsel (such as in the Criminal Justice Act) 
would likely obviate the due process attack without creating suffi­
cient incentives to open the floodgates of litigation to the market­
place.51  Alternatively, a charitable-trustee framework, as proposed 
at the conclusion of this paper, may provide a solution, whereby a 
trustee determines whether, and to what extent, funds of an organi­
zation shall be devoted to advocacy on behalf of an organization 
under investigation.52 
criminalized membership in the Communist Party). Id. at 264.  The Supreme Court 
upheld the criminalization of membership and association in an organization, provided 
that the individual was an “active” member and that the individual intended to further 
the objectives of the organization. Id. at 228-30.  These standards have essentially been 
articulated within the AEDPA and IEEPA statutes.  18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a) (2006); see 
50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-07.  Ironically, on immigration forms that query bases for inadmissi­
bility or ineligibility for certain immigration benefits, aliens are still asked whether they 
are members of the Communist Party (as well as whether they have any associations 
with terrorist organizations). 
49. In 2001, Usama bin Laden called for a financial jihad against the United 
States, “to look for [and strike] the key pillars of the U.S. economy.” BRAD K. BER­
NER, QUOTATIONS FROM OSAMA BIN LADEN 46 (2007).  This concept of depleting re­
sources or engaging in financial sabotage as a method to effect political change is 
frequently mislabeled “economic jihad.” See infra notes 97-100 and accompanying text. R 
Terrorist organizations may also avail a related strategy of “lawfare,” which has been 
described as “seizing the earliest opportunity to set up regulations.” QIAO  LIANG  & 
WANG  XIANGSUI, UNRESTRICTED  WARFARE 55 (1999), available at http://terrorism. 
com/sites/default/files/unrestricted.pdf (discussing “international law warfare”). 
50. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see Lassiter v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 25­
27 (1981) (discussing factors to be considered to determine what deprivations of liberty 
tend towards appointing counsel). 
51. See 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (provision of Criminal Justice Act pertaining to the 
appointment of attorneys for indigent clients in federal court). 
52. See infra Part VI.C. 
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E. Criminal Enforcement 
The designation of terrorist groups serves as a deterrent be­
cause of its public notice and the direct impact on financial institu­
tions that will not execute transactions with the prohibited entities. 
However, the designation of groups also provides notice to donors 
that they will suffer substantial criminal penalties if they disregard 
the blocking orders.  The possibility of criminal prosecution pro­
vides teeth to the designation of terrorist groups and serves to re­
affirm the deterrent purpose of designating organizations and 
individuals.  Laws that criminalize the transfer of funds to terrorist 
organizations constitute a departure from the traditional financial 
crimes that are prosecuted in the United States, which typically in­
volve “dirty money.”  In dirty-money cases, there is always an un­
derlying crime involved to either generate the dirty money, or for 
which the money is being cleaned.53  In “clean-money” cases, the 
criminality does not come from the source of the funding but, 
rather, by examining the intended recipient of the funds.  The trans­
fer is rendered criminal because of the fiat of the Executive.54  Be­
cause clean money is not easily tied to any specific criminal act, it 
becomes much harder to detect.55  Indeed, even when successful, 
some argue that such prosecutions are actually counterproductive 
53. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956. 
54. Proving intent of the donor is a challenge for evidentiary reasons but also 
because what facts about a recipient organization a donor must know in order to be 
held criminally liable is an area of evolving law.  Section 2339B of title 18 of the United 
States Code prohibits a person from “knowingly provid[ing] material support or re­
sources to a” designated FTO. Id. § 2339B(a)(1).  After some cases held that the gov­
ernment was obligated to prove that a criminal defendant knew that the Secretary of 
State had designated the organization as an FTO and that the government was obli­
gated to show that a criminal defendant knew that the aid was going to support the 
terrorist objectives of the organization, the statute was amended. See Intelligence Re­
form and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, § 6603, 118 Stat. 3638, 
3762 (2004) (extended permanently in USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthoriza­
tion Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177, § 104, 120 Stat. 192, 195 (2006)); see also United 
States v. Al-Arian, 329 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1304 n.24 (M.D. Fla. 2004).  Section 2339B 
now reads as follows: 
To violate this paragraph, a person must have knowledge that the organization
 
is a designated terrorist organization (as defined in subsection (g)(6)), that the
 
organization has engaged or engages in terrorist activity (as defined in section
 
212(a)(3)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act), or that the organization
 
has engaged or engages in terrorism (as defined in section 140(d)(2) of the
 
Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989).
 
18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1). 
55. See Clunan, supra note 12, at 261. R 
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to the preventative measures necessary to stop the succor of terror­
ist groups.56 
Since money that is funneled to terrorist organizations cannot 
frequently be shown to be of the “dirty” variety, to block such 
transfers, statutes criminalize “material support” for terrorism or 
designated terrorist organizations.  The narrower of such statutes, 
18 U.S.C. § 2339A, proscribes the act of providing “material sup­
port or resources” to a recipient when the provider knows or in­
tends such support to be used “in preparation for[ ] or in carrying 
out” specified crimes of violence.57  This statute, which has existed 
since 1994, is not a substantial departure from existing criminal con­
spiracy laws because the purpose of financing still is to further the 
crimes of international terrorism.  While proving such intent is diffi­
cult, there is now a substantial history of criminal cases in which the 
individuals intentionally sought to further the terrorist objectives of 
various organizations.58  Section 2339A also does not rely on the 
designation lists as the source of its criminalizing transfers. 
Consequently, the principal material-support statute used to 
discourage systemic terrorist financing is 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, which 
prohibits anyone from knowingly providing (or knowingly attempt­
ing or conspiring to provide) “material support or resources to a 
[designated] foreign terrorist organization.”59  Unlike § 2339A, 
§ 2339B does not require proof that the donor specifically intended 
that his support or resources be used for terrorist activity; therefore, 
56. Id. at 270.  Consider also that providing funds to support terrorists may be 
considered malum in se, but that a blacklist regime relies on accountability primarily 
under a theory of the conduct being malum prohibitum. 
57. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(a).  According to the statute, the term “material support 
or resources means any property, tangible or intangible, or service, including currency 
or monetary instruments or financial securities [and] financial services,” thereby cover­
ing a wide range of asset types. Id. § 2339A(b). 
58. See, e.g., United States v. Aref, 285 F. App’x 784, 789 (2d Cir. 2008); United 
States v. Hir, 517 F.3d 1081, 1084 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v. Chandia, 514 F.3d 
365, 371 (4th Cir. 2008); United States v. Koubriti, 509 F.3d 746, 748-49 (6th Cir. 2007); 
United States v. Lakhani, 480 F.3d 171, 175 (3d Cir. 2007); United States v. Hassoun, 
476 F.3d 1181 (11th Cir. 2007); United States v. Arnaout, 431 F.3d 994, 1003 (7th Cir. 
2005). 
59. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1).  The statute explicitly requires that the “person must 
have knowledge that the organization is a designated terrorist organization, . . . [and] 
that the organization has engaged or engages in terrorist activity . . . [or] terrorism.” Id. 
Because there is a scienter requirement that the accused knowingly committed the 
crime, the fair warning concerns are lessened and hence raise the bar for a defendant’s 
due process claim. See Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 
U.S. 489, 499 (1982); United States v. Ragen, 314 U.S. 513, 524 (1942) (“A mind intent 
upon willful evasion is inconsistent with surprised innocence.”). 
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§ 2339B makes it a crime to provide support to even the nonviolent 
activities of a designated terrorist organization.60  Thus, charges 
brought under § 2339B turn on whether the donor knew the organi­
zation or individual she funded was a prohibited recipient.  The 
AEDPA and IEEPA statutes therefore work in concert with the 
designation process by criminalizing knowing support for a 
designee. 
Supplementing these statutes is the seldom-used offense of ter­
rorism financing, 18 U.S.C. § 2339C, which responded to the obliga­
tion to implement the Terrorism Financing Convention effective in 
2002.61  The jurisdictional breadth of the statute is broad but largely 
symbolic, as terrorism-financing prosecutions are already typically 
covered within existing jurisdiction criteria for criminal cases.62 
Moreover, because § 2339C requires a double-intent element for 
conviction, a person must intend that the financing go both to a 
designated FTO and for a terrorism purpose; it is an unattractive 
charging choice when § 2339A and § 2339B capture the same 
conduct.63 
Where § 2339C can help fill an important void, however, lies in 
its concealment prong.  Under the statute, concealing the past, pre­
sent, or future intended provision of support or assets to a terrorist 
organization is also implicated as terrorist financing.64  This tailored 
60. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1).  The knowledge requirement of § 2339B(a) has 
been upheld by the federal courts. See Humanitarian Law Project v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 
916, 927 (9th Cir. 2009).  The Ninth Circuit held that “due process is satisfied without 
proof of specific intent” because the statute does not allow punishment of a “donor 
defendant for crimes [of the] donee foreign terrorist organization”; therefore, the stat­
ute “does not impose vicarious criminal liability.” Id.  Additionally, Congress, in enact­
ing the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, explicitly said that 
“knowledge of an organization’s designation [or] engagement in . . . terrorism is re­
quired to convict under [§] 2339B(a).” Id. 
61. 18 U.S.C. § 2339C; Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism Convention Im­
plementation Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-197, 116 Stat. 721. 
62. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(d) (explicitly describing extraterritorial jurisdic­
tion based on U.S. interest). 
63. Two prosecutions have invoked § 2339C: United States v. Alishtari, No. 1:07­
cr-00115-AKH (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2009) (PACER) (guilty plea entered September 29, 
2009) and United States v. Ranjha, No. 1:07-cr-00239-MJG (D. Md. Aug. 22, 2008) 
(PACER) (charging the concealment prong without a separate charge under §§ 2339A 
or 2339B in a money laundering case). 
64. 18 U.S.C. § 2339C(c) provides a ten-year felony for whoever 
(2) knowingly conceals or disguises the nature, location, source, ownership, or 
control of any material support or resources, or any funds or proceeds of such 
funds—(A) knowing or intending that the support or resources are to be pro­
vided, or knowing that the support or resources were provided, in violation of 
section 2339B of this title; or (B) knowing or intending that any such funds are 
315 
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liability for those who shield individuals and organizations who op­
erate as fronts and shells for terrorist organizations recognizes the 
reality of the tradecraft necessary to function as a financier.  Finan­
ciers rely on concealment by themselves and others.  Here too, 
however, the evidentiary hurdle will require proof of a specific in­
tent to conceal and, arguably, the specific knowledge of the act or 
terrorist group that the money was intended to finance.65  Despite 
§ 2339C’s ambition, other criminal statutes usually reach the same 
conduct and offer comparable penalties, including the other mate­
rial support statutes, as well as statutes criminalizing the giving of 
false statements or scheming to conceal in matters involving terror­
ism, money laundering, obstruction of justice, conspiracy, and aid­
ing and abetting.66  Still, charging under § 2339C not only imposes a 
targeted deterrent remedy to the crime, especially one involving so-
called clean money, but it also brings with it a greater likelihood of 
detention pending trial and applicability of the influential terrorism 
enhancement under the United States Sentencing Guidelines.67 
The legal framework for combating terrorist financing also in­
cludes the utilization of criminal statutes that are not exclusive to 
terrorist-related activity.  Such statutes are useful for prosecuting 
terrorist financing because connecting such activity beyond a rea­
sonable doubt to terrorist acts overseas is difficult and because ter­
to be provided or collected, or knowing that the funds were provided or col­
lected, in violation of subsection (a). 
§ 2339C(c)(1)(B)(2). 
65. The Supreme Court is expected to imminently articulate the constitutional 
parameters of the “I didn’t know that was illegal” defense in the material-support con­
text, albeit in a slightly different paradigm.  In Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, the 
Court granted certiorari to determine whether certain provisions of AEDPA, namely 
those dealing with the provision of “technical assistance,” “expert advice or assistance,” 
and “services,” are unconstitutionally vague.  Humanitarian Law Project v. Mukasey, 
552 F.3d 916 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. granted sub nom. Humanitarian Law Project v. 
Holder, 130 S. Ct. 49 (2009).  It is reasonable to expect that the Court’s vagueness anal­
ysis might include whether a person of ordinary intelligence must be aware of the FTO 
status of a recipient and that the nature of his assistance would be materially helpful to 
the FTO within broad prohibitions of § 2339B.  The Court could also discuss the fungi­
bility of assistance, the mixed motives of provision of support, and the overbreadth of 
sanctions regimes, and it may clarify the bounds of statutory limitation on an individ­
ual’s right to support (through words or advocacy) a terrorist organization.  These facts 
drive the policy reasons for a vigorous financial sanctions regime.  The Court’s decision 
will invariably provide some guidance to the discussion of terrorism financing and, per­
haps more practically, publicly deter or encourage certain behavior among the donor 
community. 
66. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 371, 1001, 1510, 1956, 2339A, 2339B. 
67. See id. § 3142(f)(1)(A); U.S. SENTENCING  GUIDELINES  MANUAL § 3A1.4 
(2006). 
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rorists often use alternative financing mechanisms—including 
various forms of criminal activity—facially unconnected to terror­
ism and that are not readily forensically reconstructible.68  For in­
stance, terrorist-financing prosecutions may rely on money 
laundering statutes, which prohibit financial transactions involving 
proceeds that derive from unlawful activity.69  Thus, regulatory re­
gimes and reporting requirements pertaining to ordinary financial 
crimes also provide mechanisms to help both detect and disrupt po­
tential terrorism financing.  For example, by requiring financial in­
stitutions to establish anti-money laundering programs, there are 
greater systemic indicators of potential terror financing.70  Simi­
larly, requiring adherence to the currency-transaction reporting re­
quirements related to the movement of monetary instruments 
serves to detect and punish aberrant activity, such as smuggling 
cash, that is indicative of money laundering and terrorist-financing 
activity.71  Requiring such offense-neutral data to be liberally 
shared within the Treasury Department’s Financial Crimes Enforce­
ment Network also strengthens detection of all-hazards by security 
agencies.72  These tools, in addition to existing prosecution theories 
such as mail and wire fraud, money laundering, structuring and un­
licensed money remitting, and general conspiracy laws, provide di­
verse legal theories by which terrorist financiers can be detected 
and held accountable.73 
The challenge to terrorism-financing prosecutions, however, is 
not typically the theory of liability.  Rather, the most common hur­
68. See TERRORIST FINANCING, supra note 35, at 6, 10 (noting that terrorists earn R 
assets through illegal trade in commodities like drugs, weapons, and cigarettes).  In a 
well-publicized case, Mohamed Hammoud was convicted by a federal jury in North 
Carolina of cigarette smuggling, racketeering, and money laundering for diverting funds 
from a multimillion dollar cigarette trafficking operation to Hezbollah. See United 
States v. Hammoud, 381 F.3d 316, 329 (4th Cir. 2004) (en banc), vacated, 543 U.S. 1097 
(2005). 
69. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1) (prohibiting financial transactions involving pro­
ceeds of some “specified unlawful activity”); id. § 1957(a) (punishing “monetary trans­
action[s] in criminally derived property” values over $10,000).  Providing material 
support to terrorist organizations serves as a predicate offense for the crime of money 
laundering. See SEC’Y OF THE TREASURY, A REPORT TO CONGRESS IN ACCORDANCE 
WITH § 356(C) OF THE USA PATRIOT  ACT 6 (2002), available at http://www.treasury. 
gov/press/releases/reports/356report.pdf. 
70. 31 U.S.C. § 5318(h)(1). 
71. Id. § 5332. 
72. Id. § 5331. 
73. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 (conspiracy), 1341 (mail fraud), 1343 (wire fraud), 
1956 (money laundering), 1957 (using laundered money), 1960 (unlicensed money 
transmitting); 31 U.S.C. § 5324 (currency reporting violations). 
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dle is obtaining admissible evidence of what happens or is intended 
to happen to money once it makes it overseas.  The Terrorism Fi­
nancing Convention and Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties were de­
signed to create a more robust information-sharing environment, 
but they have not adequately rendered that information in an 
authenticable form that is admissible in a criminal court.74 
F. Civil Actions 
Another important legal construct relied upon in terrorist-
financing prosecutions derives from civil forfeiture statutes, which 
generally authorize the forfeiture of property traceable to specified 
violations or offenses.75  All assets can be forfeited, regardless of 
whether they are foreign or domestic, or in possession of any per­
son, entity, or organization derived from, used for, or intended to 
support, plan, or perpetrate an act of international terrorism or a 
federal crime of terrorism against the United States, its citizens, or 
U.S. property.76  These added tools have generally helped ease the 
government’s ability to initiate forfeitures in the terrorist financing 
context by extending civil forfeiture statutes to various serious of­
fenses committed abroad in violation of foreign law if the property 
is located in the United States.  This allows, for instance, for the 
forfeiture of funds deposited in a foreign bank that has an in­
terbank account in a U.S. financial institution.77 
A dynamic component of the U.S. legal framework for 
terrorist-financing enforcement involves civil suits brought by U.S. 
citizen-victims of international terrorism against domestic organiza­
tions that allegedly finance such terrorism.78  These lawsuits aim to 
74. See International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terror­
ism, G.A. Res. 54/109, U.N. Doc. A/54/109 (Dec. 9, 1999) (requiring states to criminal­
ize the financing of terrorism and provide investigative assistance, but, according to 
article 12, denying use of information provided in a criminal proceeding without prior 
approval of the requested state). 
75. See 18 U.S.C. § 981 (civil forfeiture); cf. id. § 982 (criminal forfeiture). 
76. Id.  § 981(a)(1)(G); see, e.g., Verified Amended Complaint at ¶ 148, United 
States v. All Right, Title, & Interest of Assa Corp., No. 08-CIV-10934 (RJH) (S.D.N.Y. 
Nov. 16, 2009), available at 2009 WL 5161058 (seeking forfeiture of skyscrapers in New 
York City). 
77. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Re­
quired to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT ACT), Pub. L. 
No. 107-56, § 319, 115 Stat. 272, 311 (2001) (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. 
§ 981(a)(1)(B)); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (c)(7)(B). 
78. Under the Alien Tort Statute, any U.S. national (or the estate or survivors of 
such person) who is injured by an act of international terrorism may sue in district court 
for treble damages.  18 U.S.C. § 2333(a); see Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 
698-99 (2004) (clarifying the viability of a private domestic cause of action when the act 
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compensate victims of terrorism and enable U.S. citizens to stand in 
place of the government and enforce domestic laws prohibiting 
U.S.-based persons and entities from financing terrorist organiza­
tions.79  These lawsuits are often criticized, however, for being 
wasteful and ineffective in satisfying judgments from overseas state 
sponsors and terrorist organizations.80  The impact of these civil 
suits, consequently, is likely to be greater when employed in concert 
with governmental action. 
II. THE REGULATION OF CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS 
The crossroads between the erection of financial controls and 
the provision of foreign aid epitomizes the challenges in regulating 
charitable organizations.  Until recently, charitable organizations 
were mildly regulated as tax-exempt organizations, with only mod­
est and unverified annual reporting.81  Such an honor system was 
of terrorism is in violation of international law); cf. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 
726 F.2d 774, 775 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (dismissing case under pre-1990 amendments for 
want of subject matter jurisdiction). 
79. In Boim v. Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development, the parents of 
a U.S. citizen who was murdered overseas brought suit under the federal terrorism-
victim statute against an individual and three U.S.-based nonprofits, claiming that their 
son was murdered by Hamas and that the nonprofits provided financial support to the 
terrorist organization before his death.  549 F.3d 685, 687-88 (7th Cir. 2008).  The Boim 
court reached two conclusions of particular importance in the context of terrorist-
financing enforcement.  The court held that the act of giving money to a terrorist group 
outside the United States falls within the scope of the federal statute that provides a 
civil cause of action for victims of international terrorism. Id. at 690-91.  The court also 
held that when someone gives money to an organization with knowledge that the entity 
is engaged in terrorism, the fact that the donor earmarked such funds for non-terrorist 
activity does not preclude liability. Id. at 698.  In reaching the latter conclusion, the 
court reasoned that money is fungible and that the terrorist organization’s social wel­
fare activity often reinforces and supports its terrorist activity. Id. 
80. See In re Islamic Republic of Iran Terrorism Litigation, 659 F. Supp. 2d 31, 
129 (D.D.C. 2009) (criticizing the exception to sovereign immunity provided in the For­
eign Sovereigns Immunities Act (FSIA) as a false hope for recovery for victims of ter­
rorism, and explaining that FSIA, without governmental assistance, encourages them to 
engage in a “meaningless kabuki dance” of civil litigation). 
81. See I.R.C. § 501(p); The Role of Charities and NGOs in the Financing of Ter­
rorist Activities: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on International Trade and Finance of the 
S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of 
the Honorable Kenneth W. Dam, Deputy Sec’y of the Treasury), available at http:// 
banking.senate.gov/02_08hrg/080102/dam.htm; IRS, Publication 557, Tax-Exempt Sta­
tus for Your Organization (2008); see also Hearing on Tax-Exempt Charitable Organiza­
tions: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 
110th Cong. (2007) (testimony of Steven T. Miller, Comm’r Tax Exempt & Gov. Enti­
ties Div.), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/miller_testimony_7_24_07.pdf 
(describing enhanced compliance measures); IRS CRIMINAL  INVESTIGATION, FISCAL 
YEAR 2003, NATIONAL  OPERATIONS, ANNUAL  BUSINESS  REPORT (2003), available at 
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tied to the fact that charity, after all, is a universally laudable activ­
ity.  More recently, the reality that some ostensibly charitable orga­
nizations have been diverting funds to terrorist organizations has 
forced a reexamination as to the role of government regulation.82 
This is especially the case when some of the aid funneled to terror­
ist organizations is in fact used for humanitarian purposes.  Given 
the ostensible purposes of charitable aid, it is not uncommon for 
domestic donors to give money without knowing that some of these 
organizations have ulterior motives to support violence.  Others, 
however, give with the implicit knowledge that some of their dona­
tions will go to terrorist organizations, if even for humanitarian as­
sistance.83  While it is true that some donors undoubtedly falsely 
claim ignorance of the fact that their donations go to support muja­
hideen (holy warriors), some are more genuine.  The fear of being 
an unwitting donor to such an organization may be as prevalent a 
concern as the risk that the government will lump all donors to an 
ostensible charity as willing donors to terrorist organizations.84 
This is often given as one reason why some people have reverted to 
giving their zakat via cash, leaving no record of the donation.85  Re­
active measures, such as this cash-only practice, undermine the 
transparency encouraged by reporting requirements and also lead 
these communities to a perception of unfair discrimination based 
on the ideas they support, or worse, the faith that they practice. 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p3847.pdf (citing 655% increase in counterterrorism in­
dictments for cases investigated by the IRS). 
82. See Victoria B. Bjorklund, Jennifer I. Reynoso & Abbey Hazlett, Terrorism 
and Money Laundering: Illegal Purposes and Activities, 25 PACE L. REV. 233, 239-42 
(2005). 
83. Numerous religious scholars, charitable organizations, and zakat committees 
translate the proper recipients as listed in the Qur’an (9:60) as including “for Allah’s 
cause, i.e for Mujahideen,” which, while capable of being interpreted broader than vio­
lent combatants, necessarily includes them.  Ziaul Islam, Zakat—A Solution for Muslim 
Poverty, http://www.contactpakistan.com/news/news188.htm (last visited Apr. 23, 2010); 
see also Tawfique Chowdhury, Is Zakat Permissible for Islamic Dawah Organisations?, 
available at http://www.masnet.org/donation/is-zakat-permissible-for-islamic-dawah­
organisations.pdf (last visited Apr. 23, 2010); A Zakat Calculation Guide, http://www. 
islamvoice.com/5pillars/zakat/calculator.htm (last visited Apr. 23, 2010).  Community 
groups, often for defensive purposes, seldom publicly acknowledge this reality or deny 
that such interpretations prevail elsewhere; a necessary recognition in order to establish 
normative behavior among domestic Muslim charities. 
84. See AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 10, at 13-15 (noting anec- R 
dotal concerns by some donors that they do not know which organizations to trust nor 
who the government will scrutinize). 
85. See id. at 122. 
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This reaction fails to recognize that the government has no in­
terest in overinclusiveness either.  Because of the standards re­
quired for government blocking actions and the mens rea 
requirements under the criminal statutes, an individual’s rights can­
not be impinged without a sufficient evidentiary showing.  In addi­
tion, not only is the national security interest great in minimizing 
the flow of funds to terrorist organizations, but the fact that many 
donors knowingly give money to these organizations because they 
are supportive of their ultimate mission is a sad reality in the face of 
such prohibitions.  Moreover, the ideological underpinning is relied 
upon by terrorist organizations in order to maximize assets.  Such 
financing, when sanctioned or ignored within a community, builds a 
culture of criminal tolerance.86  When this enabling is discovered by 
the government, the community is further alienated from the 
broader American fabric, and a pall is cast over an entire commu­
nity rather than solely over the individuals who disobeyed the law. 
Mutual retrenchment follows.  In some cases, the intentional shield­
ing of community members can itself be prosecuted under obstruc­
tion laws. 
The government’s enforcement decisions must, however, con­
tinue to be heavily weighed.  In addition to alienating a community 
and undermining long-term national interests of enlisting commu­
nity support, prosecutions of unwitting donors would fail because 
they lack the requisite intent.  These are resource-intensive investi­
gations, only a fraction of which ultimately result in enforcement 
actions.  In these actions or investigations, very seldom do members 
of the Muslim or other communities actually agree to cooperate 
with the government investigation.  This reality reflects both the de­
ficiencies in the government’s efforts to educate and to sincerely 
86. Though seldom publicly acknowledged, there is a population that knowingly 
provides to mixed-motive campaigns soliciting funds using euphemisms for humanita­
rian aid, when in fact some of the money will support those fighting for their interests. 
See, e.g., United States v. Sabir, 628 F. Supp. 2d 414, 424 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (permitting 
prosecution of medical services on behalf of terrorists); United States v. Shaw, 474 F. 
Supp. 2d 492 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (same).  Still other organizations appeal to the religious 
obligations under zakat or other tithes in order to support the fighters. See United 
States v. Mubayyid, 567 F. Supp. 2d 223, 231 (D. Mass. 2008).  Under the doctrine of 
willful blindness, these individuals cannot stick their heads in the ground in order to 
avoid the intent element when every indication is that they were aware of the mixed 
motives of the aid.  “A willful blindness [jury] instruction is appropriate ‘if (1) a defen­
dant claims a lack of knowledge, (2) the facts suggest a conscious course of deliberate 
ignorance, and (3) the instruction, taken as a whole, cannot be misunderstood as man­
dating an inference of knowledge.’”  United States v. Coviello, 225 F.3d 54, 70 (1st Cir. 
2000) (quoting United States v. Richardson, 14 F.3d 666, 671 (1st Cir. 1994)). 
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partner with these communities as well as the culture of protective­
ness which further insulates a community from the mainstream. 
The cycle of distrust alienates one from the other.  Additional re­
sources must be devoted not only to transparency and education 
within these communities but also to encourage cooperation with 
more tangible rewards, such as offering selective amnesties and spe­
cial dispensations of immigration or other administrative benefits to 
those who decide to play by the rules.  Conversely, political correct­
ness should not prevent the criticism of those who do not satisfy 
their civic responsibilities and setting normative expectations within 
the community. 
The model of terrorist groups that also serve humanitarian 
functions is not a new one.87  “Charitable donations represent a ma­
jor source of revenue for [many terrorist] organizations.”88  Conse­
87. Organizations like Hezbollah and Markaz Dawa wal Irshad/Lashkar e Taiba/ 
Jamaat ud Dawa and their sympathizers do not recognize themselves as terrorist organi­
zations but rather as resistance or humanitarian organizations, furthering the incentives 
to provide funding. See Matthew Levitt, Hezbollah Finances: Funding the Party of 
God, in TERRORISM FINANCING AND STATE RESPONSES, supra note 2, at 134, 135.  The 
existing sanctions and blocking regimes do not distinguish (publicly) between the per­
ceptions of these organizations but rather appropriately address whether they engage in 
terrorist activity. Id. at 135-36.  However, this nuance telegraphs the issue that the des­
ignation of these groups both instills resentment among the populations which sympa­
thize with the nonviolent aspects of these groups’ activities but, perhaps more 
problematically, creates a vacuum for social services in the communities where these 
groups operate. 9/11 REPORT, supra note 7, at 371-74.  Such resentment fuels recruit- R 
ment, especially when the limitation of private fund remittances from the West cannot 
completely starve groups with state sponsors, independent investment portfolios, and 
international donors.  Levitt, supra, at 141-42.  Hezbollah, for example, also prolifically 
uses front organizations and charitable organizations to raise funds such as Al Aqsa 
International Foundation, Martyr’s Organization, and Mabarrat Charity Association. 
Id. at 142-43.  In fact, groups with mixed motives, such as Hezbollah, do in fact provide 
much needed charitable and social service assistance where other entities cannot or do 
not.  For example, Hezbollah runs a network of fifty hospitals throughout Lebanon. Id. 
at 144. 
88. John L. Lombardi & David J. Sanchez, Terrorist Financing and the Tri-Border 
Area of South America: The Challenge of Effective Governmental Response in a Permis­
sive Environment, in TERRORISM FINANCING AND STATE RESPONSES, supra note 2, at 
231, 235; see U.S. DEP’T OF THE  TREASURY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE  TREASURY 
ANTI-TERRORIST  FINANCING  GUIDELINES: VOLUNTARY  BEST  PRACTICES FOR U.S.­
BASED  CHARITIES 2 (2006) [hereinafter ANTI-TERRORIST  FINANCING  GUIDELINES], 
available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/0929%20finalrevised.pdf. 
As reported through a wide range of media sources, terrorist organizations
 
deliberately establish, infiltrate, or otherwise exploit charitable organizations
 
to build terrorist support networks.  Recent developments—such as the ex­
ploitation by Lashkar e Tayyiba (a.k.a. Jamaat-ud-Dawa) and other terrorist
 
entities/charitable fronts of relief efforts following the October 2005 earth­
quake in South Asia, the critical role of Hamas-associated charities in building
 
popular support in the Palestinian territories for the terrorist organization, and
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quently, a crucial component of the legal framework for terrorist-
financing enforcement involves improved oversight and regulation 
of U.S. charitable organizations, due to the potential for misuse of 
charitable contributions and the exploitation of such entities by ter­
rorists to conceal the movement and use of funds overseas.89  In 
fact, private aid through U.S. NGOs, charitable organizations, and 
private donations (not including business investments) has been 
more than three times the amount of public governmental foreign 
aid provided by the United States.90  Encouraging business invest­
ment and the creation of multilateral capital investment funds 
should be a large component of a sustainable development model 
but will not be discussed within the limitations of this Article. 
Terrorist fundraisers masquerading as charities can easily use 
tax laws to maximize funds for terrorist activity—primarily by using 
Hezbollah’s substantial control of charitable distribution networks in southern
 
Lebanon—demonstrate the ongoing intent and effectiveness of terrorist orga­
nizations in exploiting charitable organizations and relief efforts.
 
Id. at 14. 
89. Recognizing the past and continued present potential for abuse of charities by 
terrorists, the Treasury Department has published several versions of its Anti-Terrorism 
Financing Guidelines: Voluntary Best Practices for U.S.-Based Charities.  Although the 
guidelines are not binding, they “are designed to assist charities that attempt in good 
faith to protect themselves from terrorist abuse.” ANTI-TERRORISM FINANCING GUIDE­
LINES, supra note 88, at 1 n.1. R 
90. In 2006, for example, public aid from the United States amounted to approxi­
mately $28 billion, while private aid amounted to approximately $95 billion. See HUD­
SON  INSTITUTE, supra note 9, at 10.  According to the methodology of the Hudson R 
Institute, which includes measures such as examination of tax-exempt organizations’ 
annual returns, public reporting requirements, and analysis of OECD and U.S.-govern­
ment data, the breakdown of almost $200 billion in estimated aid to developing coun­
tries in 2005 appeared as follows: 
Type of Aid Dollars (billions) % Total Aid 
U.S. Official Development Assistance 27.6 14 
U.S. Private Assistance 95.2 50 
Foundations 2.2 2 
Corporations 5.1 5 
Private and Voluntary Organizations 16.2 17 
Universities and Colleges 4.6 5 
Religious Organizations 5.4 6 
Individual Remittances 61.7 65 
U.S. Private Capital Flows 69.2 36 
U.S. Total Economic Engagement 192 100 
Id. at 14 tbl.1. 
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Internal Revenue Code § 501(c)(3) corporation status to solicit tax-
free contributions.91  Indeed, obtaining § 501(c)(3) status may be 
the single most important asset a terrorist front organization can 
obtain.  The status attracts donors because it affords a double tax 
benefit; that is, the donors to the organization can deduct the 
amount of their donation and the corporation need not pay taxes 
on any income.  More importantly, however, the § 501(c)(3) label is 
the closest thing to a barometer of legitimacy that exists in the 
realm of charitable giving in the United States.  Such a badge dra­
matically increases the income of an organization for both a tax 
benefit reason and because the likelihood of governmental reper­
cussion is low.  In fact, even if organizations have not lawfully ob­
tained recognition of their tax-exempt status, they may advertise 
themselves as having done so because of the dramatic benefit. 
While a corporation can obtain § 501(c)(3) status with only a 
modest showing of what the corporation intends to do, auditing and 
fact checking by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) does not effec­
tively verify the legitimacy of the corporation’s representations. 
Additionally, the IRS does no financial analysis to determine from 
whom, to whom, and for what the organization is transferring 
funds.92  Consequently, the IRS relies on self-reporting by charita­
ble corporations, which, if corrupt, can operate for years without 
any systemic tripwires of detection.  Indeed, the IRS’s own stan­
dards for disclosure requirements have been prone to attack for 
lack of specificity, clouding the bright-line rules as to what types of 
activities must be disclosed to the IRS and what constitutes an accu­
rate description.93  Since the IRS is responsible for regulating these 
91. Under the Internal Revenue Code, qualifying corporations are exempt from 
federal income taxes. I.R.C. § 501(a) (2006).  One such exemption applies to entities 
organized and “operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, . . . literary, or 
educational purposes,” among others. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). 
92. TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., SCREENING TAX-EXEMPT OR­
GANIZATIONS’ FILING  INFORMATION  PROVIDES  MINIMAL  ASSURANCE THAT  POTEN­
TIAL  TERRORIST-RELATED  ACTIVITIES  ARE  IDENTIFIED 3 (2007) [hereinafter 
SCREENING  TAX-EXEMPT  ORGANIZATIONS], available at http://www.treas.gov/tigta/ 
auditreports/2007reports/200710082fr.pdf; see IRS, Application for Recognition of Ex­
emption, http://www.irs.gov/charities/article/0,,id=96109,00.html (last visited Apr. 28, 
2010) (providing links to IRS, Form 1023, Application for Recognition of Exemption; 
IRS, Publication 557, Tax-Exempt Status for Your Organization (2008); and IRS, Publi­
cation 4220, Applying for 501(c)(3) Tax-Exempt Status (2009)). 
93. See, e.g., United States v. Mubayyid, 567 F. Supp. 2d 223, 225-26 (D. Mass. 
2008).  Organizations operating in or for people in conflict areas should not presump­
tively be eligible for charitable exemptions for soliciting money that could go to fighting 
when no other organization would be considered charitable for doing so. Cf. Prince v. 
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 171 (1944) (finding no constitutional infirmity in “exclud­
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corporations, they retain the responsibility, without legal and finan­
cial resources, for policing the accuracy of corporations’ reporting.94 
While some improvement has been made, the system must be re­
formed to require frequent audits, provision of financials and trans­
parency into an organization’s bank accounts and transfers, and 
end-user audits that inform other regulatory systems involving 
overseas transfers.95  Thus, while traditional tax-evasion laws have 
served as a successful tool to prosecute those who exploit the chari­
table and nonprofit sector to fund violence, they do not provide a 
reliable, timely means for detecting fraud and, consequently, are 
inefficient at stopping the flow of funds beyond deterrence.96 
Ostensible charities soliciting funds from Muslim donors have 
the added nuance that one of the pillars of Islam is to give obliga­
tory annual zakat, or annual tithe.97  Muslims around the world 
often search for recipients who can properly receive zakat funds 
under Sharia  (Islamic Law).  Some ostensible charities market 
themselves as valid recipients of money for the needy and cite to 
Quranic and scholarly phrases to justify their fundraising.  In the 
context of giving zakat, some Muslims consider the mujahideen to 
be valid beneficiaries of these donated funds.98  This is an empiri­
cally observed phenomenon, where many donors specifically de­
note that they wish their donations to go to jihad or mujahideen in 
areas of combat.99  Such donations are also driven by the theologi­
cal imperative of a concept sometimes called “economic jihad,” by 
which individuals who cannot engage in physical jihad can give 
ing [Jehovah’s Witness children] from doing [in a child labor situation] what no other 
children may do”). 
94. Referrals are the number one source for audit investigations.  Media stories 
are another substantial source of audits. See IRS, COMPLIANCE GUIDE FOR 501(C)(3) 
PUBLIC CHARITIES (2009), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p4221pc.pdf. 
95. End-user checks are periodically done in export-regulation investigations and 
require compliance, or licensing may be revoked. See Export Administration Regula­
tions (EAR), 15 C.F.R. § 744.11 (2009); SCREENING  TAX-EXEMPT  ORGANIZATIONS, 
supra note 92, at 3. R 
96. See Mubayyid, 567 F. Supp. 2d at 225-26; see also United States v. Holy Land 
Found. for Relief & Dev., No. 3:04-CR-240-G, 2007 WL 1285751 (N.D. Tex. May 2, 
2007) (upholding search of premises on the basis of, inter alia, Treasury authority to 
seize assets for tax delinquency in case involving tax charge). 
97. See AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 10, at 83. R 
98. See supra note 83. R 
99. See Trial Exhibits 56, 337, 556, Mubayyid, 567 F. Supp. 2d 223 (No. 05-40026­
FDS) (on file with author) (showing solicitations of zakat for various martyrs and muja­
hideen, among other purposes). 
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their money instead of their body to receive religious benefit.100  In­
deed, in some parts of the world, zakat is the functional equivalent 
of a “jihad tax” and is collected by the terrorist groups who “pro­
tect” the way of life.  Consequently, the vigilance against diversion 
of humanitarian aid to the Muslim world takes on a theological di­
mension beyond the average obstacles that complicate the dispersal 
of funds into weak states with undeveloped infrastructure. 
Successful prosecutions and diplomatic efforts have led to a 
growing consensus that governments have rightly focused their in­
vestigative efforts on charities that were believed to be used as 
fronts to launder money and assets to jihadists who believe that vio­
lence will achieve their desired political ends.101 
III. PUBLIC AID: STRUCTURES FOR INCREASED
 
DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE
 
While there may be a few scholars who quibble with the pro­
priety of foreign aid, it is beyond question that aid can increase the 
quality of life in other countries.  This principle has increasingly 
shaped the implementation of United States foreign policy over the 
past few decades.  During this same time, the polarization of wealth 
in the world has increased, resulting in strategic aid distribution, 
frequently for purposes of achieving certain geopolitical inter­
ests.102  Developing international powers are similarly dispensing 
foreign aid to demonstrate a hallmark of moral and economic 
standing.  In such an environment, then, it is not entirely surprising 
that a rise of violence would occur during a period of grossly dispro­
portionate economic growth in which aid has been relatively frugal. 
The peace dividend from the conclusion of the Cold War has been 
replaced by the asymmetric threat of terrorism, primarily by those 
who use the name of religion to fuel pan-national recruitment and 
operations.  During the height of the Cold War, the United States, 
along with the other Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) member states, agreed to target 0.7% of 
their gross national product for Official Development Assistance.103 
After thirty-five years, we have yet to even approach that target. 
100. See MATTHEW  LEVITT, HAMAS: POLITICS, CHARITY, AND  TERRORISM IN 
THE SERVICE OF JIHAD 52-79  (2006). 
101. See J. MILLARD BURR & ROBERT O. COLLINS, ALMS FOR JIHAD 1-10 (2006). 
102. See generally CAROL  LANCASTER, FOREIGN  AID: DIPLOMACY, DEVELOP­
MENT, DOMESTIC POLITICS  (2007). 
103. S.C. Res. 2626 (XXV), ¶ 43, U.N. Doc. A/8124 (Oct. 24, 1970).  Despite this 
target, economically developed countries have managed to provide somewhere between 
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Increasing public aid to terrorist-centric theaters reduces the 
attraction of their marketing campaign, degrades the conditions 
that can give rise to ideological terrorism, and empowers national 
governments to effectively discourage such nascence within their 
own borders.  By supporting development goals, such as educating 
governments, building up civil institutions, and buttressing the eco­
nomic infrastructure, as well as humanitarian goals, such as reduc­
ing poverty, increasing food assistance, and providing access to 
basic medical care, the United States’s interests will slowly, but 
deeply, be reinforced in the psyche of the citizens of the recipient 
countries. 
At the same time, the governments with whom the United 
States partners for increased development assistance can be sub­
jected to rigorous standards of transparency and accountability, 
while still retaining nominal and strategic input into projects—an 
essential perception to reinforcing the utility of law and govern­
ment in lawless environments.  Moreover, even aside from political 
and national security interests, humanitarian and developmental aid 
from the richest country in the world is also a laudable moral objec­
tive and is one that captures the spirit of its people.104 
U.S. public foreign aid can be divided into several categories: 
multilateral aid aimed at international entities and programs such 
as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, 
handled by the Treasury Department; economic assistance support­
ing military and security-related goals, managed by the Department 
of Defense and the Department of State; and bilateral development 
assistance, primarily overseen and administered by the U.S. Agency 
for International Development (USAID), with guidance from the 
State Department.105 
0.2% and 0.4% in development aid, and the quality of this aid has been mitigated by 
requirements of certain goods and services and catering to other vested mercantile and 
political interests.  The United States, the richest country in the world, while providing 
among the highest gross amount of aid, has provided among the least amount of devel­
opment aid of all the OECD nations, approximately 0.22%, as measured as a percent­
age of its gross national product. See HUDSON INSTITUTE, supra note 9, at 10; see also R 
Anup Shah, U.S. and Foreign Aid Assistance, http://www.globalissues.org/article/35/us 
and-foreign-aid-assistance (last updated Apr. 13, 2009) (citing OECD statistics). 
104. Clunan, supra note 12, at 263 (suggesting that the United States must under- R 
write a Counter Terrorism Financing framework). 
105. CURT TARNOFF & LARRY NOWELS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., FOREIGN AID: 
AN INTRODUCTORY OVERVIEW OF U.S. PROGRAMS AND POLICY 4-8 (2004), available 
at http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PCAAB191.pdf. 
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The Foreign Assistance Act, enacted in 1961, is the main 
source of permanent legislation authorizing most bilateral eco­
nomic assistance.106  Under the Foreign Assistance Act, the Presi­
dent may determine the terms and conditions under which 
assistance is provided.  However, most foreign aid money is appro­
priated by Congress annually through the Foreign Operations Ap­
propriations Bill, which sets out yearly spending limits.107  This 
funding legislation can be adapted pursuant to bilateral assistance 
programs and foreign-aid appropriations, which are provided 
through congressional subcommittees of the appropriations panels 
in both Houses of Congress.108 
Most funds aimed at bilateral development assistance are ad­
ministered by USAID.109  USAID is an independent federal gov­
ernment agency, established in 1961 after Congress passed the 
Foreign Assistance Act mandating the creation of an agency to ad­
minister all U.S. development-related programs.110  USAID pro­
vides economic, development, and humanitarian assistance 
worldwide in concert with U.S. foreign policy interests, such as the 
expansion of democracy and free markets.111  U.S. development-
coordination policy under USAID currently emphasizes five main 
goals, which stem from a primary U.S. foreign policy objective of 
encouraging and supporting developing countries in their efforts to 
build political, economic, and social institutions that will improve 
their citizens’ quality of living: 
(1) the alleviation of the worst physical manifestations of poverty 
among the world’s poor majority; (2) the promotion of conditions 
enabling developing countries to achieve self-sustaining eco­
nomic growth with equitable distribution of benefits; (3) the en­
106. Foreign Assistance Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 2151-2431 (2006); TARNOFF  & 
NOWELS, supra note 105, at 27. R 
107. TARNOFF & NOWELS, supra note 105, at 16, 25, 27. R 
108. Id. at 27-28; see also Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009, Pub. 
L. No. 111-73, 123 Stat. 2060 (2009) (to be codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 8401-8442) (increas­
ing nonmilitary assistance to Pakistan). 
109. TARNOFF & NOWELS, supra note 105, at 8.  In some cases, bilateral economic R 
aid may be jointly coordinated by USAID and the State Department. Id. 
110. See 22 U.S.C. § 2151(b); United States Agency for International Develop­
ment, About USAID, http://www.usaid.gov/about_usaid (last visited Apr. 28, 2010).  It 
was President Kennedy who proposed a new U.S. foreign assistance program based on 
economic, political, and moral principles.  United States Agency for International De­
velopment, USAID History, http://www.usaid.gov/about_usaid/usaidhist.html (last vis­
ited Mar. 18, 2010). 
111. United States Agency for International Development, Frequently Asked 
Questions, http://www.usaid.gov/faqs.html (last visited Apr. 28, 2010). 
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couragement of development processes in which individual civil 
and economic rights are respected and enhanced; (4) the integra­
tion of the developing countries into an open and equitable inter­
national economic system; and (5) the promotion of good 
governance through combating corruption and improving trans­
parency and accountability.112 
Besides the traditional long-term projects administered by 
USAID, bilateral development aid has been aimed at global health 
initiatives, the most prominent of which, in recent years, has been 
support of the Millennium Development Challenge and for the 
treatment of HIV/AIDS and other diseases.113  Bilateral assistance 
has also been aimed directly at autonomous federal institutions, 
such as the Peace Corps, which plays a vital role in implementing 
foreign-aid programs “in areas like education, youth outreach and 
community development, the environment and information tech­
nology.”114  USAID also administers targeted foreign assistance 
through a special account, the Economic Support Fund, to strategi­
cally important regions or specific countries with security needs that 
are closely tied to American interests.115  Such aid can be directed 
at specific countries, for instance, when unanticipated political, eco­
nomic, or security conditions arise that are deemed by the President 
to be in the United States’s national security interest.116  The For­
eign Assistance Act further empowers the President to authorize 
aid to foreign countries for antiterrorism assistance117 and explicitly 
prohibits aid to any country determined by the Secretary of State to 
112. Foreign Assistance Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2151(a). 
113. TARNOFF & NOWELS, supra note 105, at 9.  In 2003, the Bush administration R 
initiated a fifteen-billion-dollar, five-year emergency plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), 
constituting “the largest international health initiative directed at a single disease.” 
United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003, 
Pub. L. No. 108-25, 117 Stat. 711; GlobalHealth.gov, The United States President’s 
Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), http://www.globalhealth.gov/initiatives/ 
globalaids.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2010). 
114. TARNOFF & NOWELS, supra note 105, at 23; Peace Corps, About the Peace R 
Corps, http://www.peacecorps.gov/index.cfm?shell=learn (last visited Mar. 18, 2010). 
The Peace Corps, serving 139 countries and supporting nearly 200,000 volunteers and 
trainees, had an annual budget for 2009 of $340 million and has an annual budget for 
2010 of $400 million.  Peace Corps, Fast Facts, http://www.peacecorps.gov/index.cfm? 
shell=learn.whatispc.fastfacts (last visited Feb. 10, 2010).  “As a federal agency, the 
Peace Corps reports directly to Congress and the Executive Branch.”  Peace Corps, 
Leadership, http://www.peacecorps.gov/index.cfm?shell=learn.whatispc.management 
(last visited Mar. 18, 2010). 
115. See USAID, BUDGET  REQUEST FOR  ECONOMIC  SUPPORT  FUND (2009), 
available at http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2009/101425.pdf. 
116. See 22 U.S.C. § 2346. 
117. See id. § 2349aa. 
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have “repeatedly provided support for international terrorism” or 
assisted countries that aid terrorist states.118  USAID often uses the 
services of local partners to help disperse the aid.  Consequently, 
reinvesting, revitalizing, and reinventing USAID is crucial to the 
long-term success of the U.S. counterterrorism strategy. 
IV. DISPERSAL OF AID 
One of the greatest challenges in routing aid, public or private, 
has been its actual dispersal.  Since established terrorist organiza­
tions frequently provide the most effective humanitarian aid that 
exists within their domain, wholesale success of sanctions regimes 
ultimately deprives the neediest populations.  The cycle of restric­
tion of funding from the developed economies to terrorist organiza­
tions creates reliance on the local government, international 
intervention, or other locally operating NGOs.  If these institutions 
are weak, they are either co-opted by the terrorist organization or 
they are depleted of the sum total of the foreign aid through other 
forms of corruption and inefficiency.  Consequently, the neediest 
people receive less assistance than they would if the terrorist organ­
ization were dispersing the aid, and the institutions of civil society, 
such as a functioning government and commonwealth society, are 
further undermined, as is the rule of law. 
This problem has been called the “charitable backfill” issue; 
that is, when blocking actions prevent mixed-motive terrorist orga­
nizations from discharging their charitable role, there must be some 
entity that can fill that need.  If there isn’t such an entity, the popu­
lation suffers and the terrorist organizations are empowered within 
the local populations because their utility and benevolence in his­
torically rendering these services receives bolstered respect.  There 
is no simple solution to this problem, but, at the very least, these 
consequences must be contemplated within the blacklist-designa­
tion process and should be formalized as a nonpublic requirement 
of that process.  In addition, as intelligence information is examined 
during the designation process, the government must also assess 
which preferred partners operating in the arena of the putative des­
ignee can be vetted and will have the capacity to begin filling the 
humanitarian void created by designation.  Finally, USAID should 
establish region-specific norms of good corporate governance for 
those NGOs who wish to partner with USAID.  Prior to designa­
tion, the data from these efforts must be considered in assessing the 
118. Id. §§ 2371, 2377. 
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maturity of the putative back-fill partners, as must an evaluation of 
what steps can be taken to mitigate the negative impact upon the 
population. 
Through increased international cooperation, the United 
States and other economically developed countries have embarked 
on an ambitious mission to modernize financing tools and monitor­
ing of the countries in which terror groups are based.  Increasing 
technical assistance and education missions, both to governmental 
and financial-services personnel, is essential to create the systems of 
accountability and tracking necessary to ensure effective distribu­
tion of aid. 
The common obstacles to effective dispersal of aid parallel 
those that prevent effective counterterrorism financing efforts in 
the developing world—poverty, corruption, lack of education, and 
political competition.119  Most of all, effective dispersal requires the 
rule of law, the ability to enforce it, and the trained expertise across 
disciplines to be vigilant against terrorist financing.120  Effective dis­
persal will also require substantial development investment to get 
to this level of sophistication.  Where possible, the United States 
should employ a bias toward developing local government capacity 
to deliver the aid that the U.S. contracts (or central-authority subsi­
dies) provide.  This will empower local civic infrastructure for the 
day when foreign subsidization is unnecessary.  Similarly, by en­
couraging aid to be utilized for societal development goals rather 
than basic humanitarian subsistence, when possible, USAID can be 
associated with longer standing development impact.  For example, 
by investing in infrastructure projects, such as building schools, 
water treatment plants, and hospitals, the local populations will 
have long-standing reminders of the value and sincerity of U.S. aid. 
A. Corruption 
One of the greatest challenges to the effectiveness of any an­
titerrorism financing regime is the corruption of government offi­
cials and of weak governments altogether.  There are simply no 
consensus solutions here.121  An uncontroversial starting point, 
however, is that weak governments must be supported with dispro­
119. See Lombardi & Sanchez, supra note 88, at 244-45. R 
120. Id. 
121. The diaspora and affinity communities are perhaps more attuned to the 
problems of corruption and waste within troubled areas and should be consulted on 
techniques to implement aid in troubled areas.  Increasing the visibility of the United 
States’s awareness of this reality, along with the adoption of a nonpatronizing approach 
331 
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portionate development aid and cultivation of their own domestic 
social infrastructure.  This does not mean that aid should be lav­
ished upon a weak or corrupt government in the hopes that they 
adopt international norms of behavior.  Rather, staggered aid to 
preferred partners who work with domestic government, rather 
than for domestic government entities, can build trust, establish 
benchmarks for efficiency, and develop lasting partnerships be­
tween the couriers of aid and the dispensers.  Slowly building a do­
mestic governmental capacity for distribution will help to empower 
the perception of the establishment’s humanitarian role and to le­
gitimize its supremacy to competitor organizations such as terrorist 
groups. 
A talking point with every developing economy should be to 
encourage adoption of the international norms established by the 
United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) and to 
report on the progress of implementing measures.122  The UNCAC 
requires, among other things, the adoption of preventative mea­
sures, criminalization of abuses, assistance to investigation, repatri­
ation of assets, and provision of technical assistance.123  The United 
States can couple favored-recipient status to the achievement of ob­
jective benchmarks of governmental transparency and anticorrup­
tion progress. 
When U.S. aid is delivered, the same tools used to investigate 
private, foreign investment can be modified to audit the nonprofit 
model.  One of these tools is the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.124 
The threat of accountability for graft, whether channeled private 
donations or through public-aid grants, extends not only to U.S. 
employees and contractors but also to the foreign nationals who 
to dealing with this issue, could only increase the respect and efficiency for such an aid 
regime. 
122. UNITED  NATIONS  OFFICE ON  DRUGS AND  CRIME, UNITED  NATIONS  CON­
VENTION  AGAINST  CORRUPTION, at iii (2004), available at http://www.unodc.org/ 
documents/treaties/UNCAC/Publications/Convention/08-50026_E.pdf. 
123. Id. 
124. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78dd-1, 
78dd-2, 78dd-3, 78ff (2006).  “In general, the FCPA prohibits corrupt payments to for­
eign officials for the purpose of obtaining or keeping business.”  Dep’t of Justice, Lay­
Person’s Guide to FCPA: Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Antibribery Provisions, http:// 
www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/docs/dojdocb.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2010).  To the 
extent that the FCPA can be more tailored to pertain to foreign contractors who are 
receiving or helping to disperse public aid, a legislative solution may be necessary to 
clarify the distinction that the FCPA makes between outright bribery and the “cost of 
doing business.” 
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steer contracts to their personal interests.125  The United States can 
also require good governance principles—such as standards of 
transparency of productivity and expenditures of funds, regular 
field auditing, and inspectors deployed commensurately with the 
amount of aid—in order to police its efficiency in the face of com­
parable projects. 
Programmatically, one of the ways to limit the exposure to cor­
rupt counterparties is to establish a progressive graduation of the 
award of contracts from low-risk, small outlay projects at the begin­
ning of a relationship to higher-risk, capital-intensive projects once 
trust and oversight is established.126  For example, providing devel­
opment aid in the form of basic education and technical assistance 
cannot easily be co-opted by local elites or governmental officials. 
However, such projects educate, build trust, and provide a barome­
ter for aid-givers to measure the competence of would-be partners 
with modest risk.  A similar means to avoid the inefficiencies and 
waste of corrupt or weak regimes is to solicit project-specific grants 
and award them conditioned upon oversight and based on interna­
tional benchmarks of cost and quality.  Ultimately, corruption can 
be countered by encouraging, reinforcing, and rewarding govern­
mental partners who obey the rule of law and meet intuitive 
benchmarks set by experienced aid providers. 
B. Develop Preferred Aid Dispersal Partners 
Creating an array of vetted aid distributors can dramatically 
reduce the “charitable backfill” problem.  While giving money to 
foreign governments may be an attractive quick fix, in practice, the 
net result is frequently co-option of aid agendas, corruption, and 
waste.  If money stays out of foreign sovereign hands while the for­
eign voice is heard at the table of prioritization, then the risk of the 
perversion or waste of aid is reduced, and the equity that they 
champion is still heard.  Consequently, NGOs and private-preferred 
aid distribution partners must be groomed to fill the humanitarian 
void created when a mixed-motive terrorist organization’s assets 
are frozen.  Moreover, such potential partners must be identified 
during the designation process, not afterward. 
125. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1.  The 1998 amendments expanded extraterritorial juris­
diction to foreign nationals. 
126. See generally PETE  EWINS ET AL., MAPPING THE  RISKS OF  CORRUPTION IN 
HUMANITARIAN ACTION 25-29 (2006), available at http://www.u4.no/pdf/?file=/Themes/ 
ces/documents/mapping-risks-corruption-humanitarian-action.pdf. 
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A tripartite partnership between the international donor of aid 
(United States/World Bank/IMF), a local governmental agency, and 
a certified, preferred aid-dispersal NGO may be the solution.  Such 
a relationship can increase the quantity of aid, improve its 
efficiency, and improve respect for the rule of law.  The most chal­
lenging part of this proposal, however, is to cultivate vetted private-
sector, preferred partners.  It is more enforceable to impose 
conditions on private entities than governments.  Each partner must 
live up to benchmarks and follow core principles of good govern­
ance: they must receive graduated dispersals of aid conditioned on 
demonstration of competence; they must provide for accurate and 
timely auditing data; they must demonstrate efficacy by peer-
reviewed standards; their methods must be replicable (or in unique 
circumstances, they must be certified by peer review); they must 
develop methods that are sustainable over time; and they must en­
courage development of market structures, such as microfinance 
programs, so that success is measured by how many people no 
longer require subsistence aid, rather than how many they have 
served. 
The OECD countries, led by the United States, must assist the 
IMF and World Bank’s system of auditing and feedback to identify 
and train potential preferred partners.  Those organizations that 
achieve these benchmarks can benefit from an influx of bilateral 
and multilateral aid, an internationally recognized certification, and 
a reputation that can compete with those of terrorist organizations 
that provide charitable aid in these regions.  As more aid is fun­
neled into these areas, certified charities who partner with the inter­
national community and local governmental agencies can fill the 
gaps left when a terrorist organization is incapacitated or limited by 
the freezing of its assets. 
Despite a layered gatekeeping at the recruiting, training, im­
plementing, and auditing phases of preferred partners, some loss 
due to fraud and waste is expected in the most automated and de­
veloped grant systems.127  However, a scaled version of disclosure 
127. The standards for overseas expenditures should strive to be as transparent as 
domestic outlays.  For example, to claim a portion of the funding under the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), recipients submit detailed proposals 
explaining how the money will be used, how its use will be monitored, the need for the 
ARRA as a source, and the anticipated net effects of the investment.  In addition to the 
ARRA’s separate Inspector General and auditing procedures, as well as individual 
agency and congressional oversight, the Recovery Accountability and Transparency 
Board was created for the express purposes of providing transparency in relation to the 
use of recovery-related funds and to prevent and detect fraud, waste, and mismanage­
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and auditing requirements must accompany foreign aid to terrorist 
havens in order to assure transparency.  As one spigot turns off, the 
other must turn on, albeit with safeguards to ensure that the stream 
is not unexpectedly diverted. 
V. NEW LEGAL FRAMEWORKS TO CONSIDER 
A. A Public Option for Provision of Foreign Aid 
As described above, increased regulation and attention has de­
terred, or has been perceived to deter, the transfer of private aid to 
needy areas of the world, particularly to countries with large Mus­
lim populations.  The deterrence of such aid, while prudent to com­
bat terrorism financing, impacts the long-term perception of the 
domestic U.S. population as well as the governments, populations, 
and terrorist groups abroad that would otherwise benefit from the 
aid.  In order to continue to encourage the productive donation of 
private aid and to increase the overall efficiency of the aid, govern­
ment can play an important complementary role. 
As the current administration considers how to reorganize the 
U.S. aid distribution structure, it should also consider whether it 
can be decoupled from other foreign policy objectives.  There 
should be an imperative to reduce the demand for humanitarian aid 
provided by terrorist organizations.  In this vein, the U.S. govern­
ment can provide another unique customer service as the banker of 
last resort: it can provide an option to its taxpayers to be willing to 
transfer money from private citizens to needy areas for the sole 
purpose of providing humanitarian and development aid—a Hu­
manitarian Assistance Fund.128  By partnering with its own popula­
tion, the U.S. government can pledge to disperse humanitarian and 
ment. See Recovery.gov, The Recovery Accountability and Transparency Board, http:// 
www.recovery.gov/About/board/Pages/TheBoard.aspx (last visited Apr. 28, 2010). 
128. An earmarked voluntary donation, including a tax benefit similar to a dona­
tion to a § 501(c)(3) organization, could be made through annual tax returns.  For fur­
ther specificity, a schedule providing various recipient options, including some that 
would satisfy zakat obligations, could be attached.  A Muslim-specific, vetted donor 
vehicle has admirably been proposed by another commentator; however, it is unfairly 
narrow in scope, is not necessarily a publicly-run option, and encourages anonymity. 
See Nina J. Crimm, Muslim-Americans’ Charitable Giving Dilemma: What About a Cen­
tralized Terror-Free Donor Advised Fund?, 13 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 375 (2008). 
My proposal is not designed exclusively to immunize Muslims donations but rather is a 
balanced, state-run regulatory vehicle that furthers its national security interests and 
incidentally provides Muslims, and everyone else, an alternative to provide responsible 
aid to foreign populations.  In this sense, it is similar to the taxpayer option of volunta­
rily contributing to the Treasury in order to reduce the national debt. 
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development aid as directed to certain needy areas, particularly 
those with large Muslim populations, in consultation with commu­
nity-based advisors, such as religious scholars and governmental 
representatives of the recipient areas.  Using either existing NGO-
contracted local conduits of aid, through USAID or through local 
governmental arms, when an American provides private aid 
through the U.S. government, he can do so without the risk of being 
indicted for provision of material support to terrorists.129  In this 
way, the United States can offer a public option for private aid, a 
“white list” of one, and may decide to match funds or supplement 
private aid with public monies. 
The benefits to the U.S. government of incorporating private 
aid in its total aid are obvious: the number of real dollars in aid 
dramatically increases, the synergies of aid distribution are likely to 
render aid more efficient, and transparency increases in terms of 
real-time governmental oversight.  Public relations with parts of the 
world that presently resent the United States are likely to improve, 
and minority populations will feel greater enfranchisement by pro­
portionally leveraging their power as U.S. taxpayers to further their 
community objectives.  More pragmatically for enforcement and 
regulatory purposes, however, is that the transparency into the fi­
nancing process will be immediate and will further the goals of the 
increased reporting requirements.  For American Muslims and 
other groups who have inadequate vetted options for provision of 
foreign aid, a safe alternative to the traditional and opaque process 
of zakat and sadaqah donation may be a welcome option, even if 
the government does not recognize it as a religiously based dona­
tion.130  While there are admittedly a number of details that would 
129. See also the Combined Federal Campaign (CFC), a program offered to fed­
eral employees to pool funds for various NGOs in order to streamline the efficiency of 
distribution.  5 C.F.R. §§ 950.101-.901 (2009). 
130. In some countries, zakat is regulated by the government explicitly; in others, 
it is collected by terrorist organizations. See Aurel Croissant & Daniel Barlow, Terror­
ism Financing and Government Responses in Southeast Asia, in TERRORISM FINANCING 
AND  STATE  RESPONSES, supra note 2, at 203, 209; Moyara de Moraes Ruehsen, Arab R 
Government Responses to the Threat of Terrorist Financing, in TERRORISM FINANCING 
AND  STATE  RESPONSES, supra note 2, at 152, 165.  This practice, however, is largely R 
influenced by theological guidance of who are the proper collectors and recipients of 
zakat.  For example, governmental collection of zakat is more acceptable if the govern­
ment is a Muslim government operating pursuant to Sharia.  For some schools in Islam, 
if a non-Muslim government were to collect mandatory alms, it would be perceived as a 
sin.  Consequently, the proposal of this option will compel a public discussion of what 
zakat reforms, if any, the community will be willing to adopt in order to ensure that 
money is not going to terrorist organizations. 
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have to be resolved before implementation of such a program, this 
paper aims to start that discussion by proposing a construct that 
reconciles many of the policy and legal issues. 
While assuredly the prospect of disclosing certain personal de­
tails to the government may be unpalatable to some, to do so on a 
tax form should only be mildly more invasive, if at all, than disclos­
ing one’s income and the recipient of one’s charitable donations.  A 
constitutional attack on a system where the United States discrimi­
nates on behalf of providing bundled donations of foreign aid to 
specific needy populations, even if portions are earmarked exclu­
sively for overseas Muslims, is not likely to succeed.131 
B. Gray Lists 
The creation of “white lists,” or lists of organizations that have 
been vetted and determined to be safe organizations, is often pro­
posed and just as frequently criticized.132  One side argues that such 
a list would stigmatize and discourage donations to existing organi­
zations whose objectives may not coincide with U.S. national inter­
ests, and the other argues that such a list would effectively 
immunize the organizations from prosecution and would be slow to 
detect changed circumstances.133  Another alternative is to stop 
short of a “white list” but to recognize a class of organizations that 
have adopted required good governance practices without immu­
131. On its face, several factors make a constitutional attack on the selective dis­
persal of funds to a designated population unlikely to succeed.  First, even more dis­
criminatory collection and distribution is permitted domestically through § 501(c)(3) 
organizations. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 603-04 (1983).  Sec­
ond, the Executive has exclusive domain in the area of international relations, espe­
cially when involving national security. See Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 242 (1984); 
Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 292 (1981).  Moreover, because a Humanitarian Assistance 
Fund would disperse funds to a variety of international communities, it would be a 
facially-neutral law which would disperse funds commensurate with the earmarked tax­
payer donors.  Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-79 (1990) (confirming that 
strict constitutional scrutiny does not apply to facially neutral laws).  The same scrutiny 
applicable to IEEPA and AEDPA would justify such a program. See supra note 41 and R 
accompanying text.  Finally, overseas recipients of funds, or those grieved by not receiv­
ing funds, do not have the constitutional rights to challenge a de facto discriminatory 
practice.  Even if construed as a speech-specific regulation, such a regulation would 
likely survive strict scrutiny. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 29 (1976); cf. United 
States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (applying intermediate scrutiny when only 
incidental regulation of speech content). 
132. See AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 10, at 23. R 
133. See id.; Muslim Public Affairs Council, American Muslim Charities: Easy 
Targets in the War on Terror (Dec. 3, 2004), available at http://www.mpac.org/article. 
php?id=355 (articulating government’s stated reasons to Muslim groups’ calls for a do­
nation white list). 
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nizing them from enforcement actions.  Such practices would in­
clude certifying education and training on essential business 
practices, adopting fiduciary obligations to their donors and the 
beneficiaries of their work, subjecting themselves and their officers 
to rigorous auditing procedures and accountability measures, pro­
viding transparent real-time access to their finances and operations, 
and agreeing a priori to take remedial measures required by the 
government.  If necessary, this would include agreeing to the freez­
ing of assets while the government investigates them. 
For example, such a freeze could follow a real-time intelligence 
report that identifies a particular beneficiary as a newly emerged 
terrorist threat.  In exchange for such rigorous transparency proto­
cols, donors and organizations could take some modicum of solace 
in knowing that it would be a difficult case indeed to demonstrate 
criminal intent.  Consequently, by encouraging such good govern­
ance practices, the government (i.e., the IRS or whichever agency is 
designated) can create incentives for cooperation with the sanctions 
regime rather than incentives for avoiding it. 
C. Charitable Trustee 
When an organization is under investigation, a “charitable 
trustee” could be appointed as essentially a receiver of a charitable 
organization, as if the organization were involuntarily entered into 
bankruptcy.  A trustee’s appointment could be conditioned upon a 
sufficient objective showing that a charitable group’s activities may 
be acting contrary to U.S. national security interests.  This hybrid 
construct marries the receivership concept of domestic bankruptcy 
law, which allows for immediate transparency into an organization, 
with the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States 
(CFIUS) process, where national security concerns can be raised by 
external forces that will subject a charitable organization to the con­
trol of the trustee or other suitable sanction, including potentially a 
blocking order.134  The efficacy of a trustee, whose primary alle­
134. CFIUS, as administered by the U.S. Department of the Treasury, reviews 
and approves business transactions involving the ownership interest of foreign individu­
als or entities of U.S. companies.  50 App. U.S.C.A. § 2170 (West Supp. 2009).  Con­
cerns that give rise to CFIUS are frequently voluntarily corporation-originated but can 
also be based on concerns of the board itself based on media reports or other intelli­
gence information. See U.S. GOV’T  ACCOUNTABILITY  OFFICE, DEFENSE  TRADE: EN­
HANCEMENTS TO THE  IMPLEMENTATION OF  EXON-FLORIO  COULD  STRENGTHEN THE 
LAW’S  EFFECTIVENESS 8-9 (2005), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05686. 
pdf.  An overview of the CFIUS is available at http://www.treas.gov/offices/ 
international-affairs/cfius/overview.shtml. 
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giance will be to the national security interests of the United States, 
will be more discerning than blanket blocking orders and will also 
allow greater transparency and intelligence about a charitable 
group’s activities than a mere adversarial audit by the IRS.  To the 
extent that a charitable organization has chosen to take advantage 
of § 501(c)(3) status, just as it bears the risk of audit, it would con­
tractually bear the risk of falling into receivership. 
CONCLUSION 
Countering the drivers that lead organizations to terrorism as a 
means to a political end requires a long-term view, a sense of un­
derstanding, and a holistic approach to modifying policies and ac­
tions that feed the flame of radicalization.  While many of these 
drivers may not be influenced by rational countermeasures, there 
are many government-based tools that can more effectively miti­
gate the attractiveness or the perceived necessity of terrorism fi­
nancing.  On a macroscopic level, socioeconomic factors can be 
manipulated with the influx of wealth, education, goodwill, and op­
portunity.  When bolstered pragmatically, these may be the most 
effective tools to counter the rhetoric that feeds the radicalization 
necessary to fuel organized terror. 
Encouraging charitable aid and using creative government­
brokered systems for deploying such aid will marginalize mixed-
motive terrorist organizations and promote goodwill toward U.S. 
development initiatives.  Such initiatives must include promoting 
the rule of law and empowering local NGO and governmental part­
ners to sustain themselves.  By increasing development aid, weak 
and corrupt states can better satisfy their humanitarian needs and 
can further delegitimize organizations who insist on keeping terror 
in their arsenal to achieve their ends.  As terrorist organizations are 
stigmatized by necessary blocking actions and international oppro­
brium, partnerships of international aid agencies, local govern­
ments, and preferred NGO partners can fill the gaps of aid 
heretofore filled by the terrorist organizations.  An environment 
that fosters constructive ideas rather than adherence to reactive 
thinking, where basic needs are satisfied through self-reliance 
rather than reliance upon others, and in which an open and self-
determinative government provides a steady hope of progress is 
hardly one in which terrorism will be a tolerated political tool. 
